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Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress required residential mort-
gage lenders to make a reasonable determination of borrowers’ ability to 
repay before extending credit. Most regard this ability-to-repay rule as a 
consumer-protection provision. Less well-appreciated is the rule’s impor-
tance in protecting financial stability. 
We respond to a landmark 2015 critique in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, which argued that the rule will fail to limit 
bubbles because mortgage lenders will underestimate their liability ex-
posure when home prices are rapidly appreciating and ignore the rule 
as a consequence. On the contrary, we argue that the ability-to-repay 
rule acts as a circuit breaker that will help prevent poorly underwritten 
loans from fueling a future bubble in housing prices that creates the 
risk of financial collapse. 
Without the ability-to-pay rule, loan-to-value limits are not enough to 
curb property bubbles. Although loan-to-value limits are important to 
constraining risk, the denominator—the value—will become artificially 
elevated during a bubble and will only fall after the bust is underway, 
shrouding the elevated default risk at origination and giving false confi-
dence that mortgage risk is contained. Moreover, we know from the crisis 
that the inability to repay exacerbates default risk, along with the result-
ing further depression in housing prices. The ability-to-repay rule is a 
collective-action solution to this source of systemic risk and a vital main-
stay of financial stability.   
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INTRODUCTION 
After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress required residential mortgage lenders, 
before extending credit, to first make a reasonable determination of applicants’ 
ability to repay.1 The question is: why? After all, caveat emptor had been the tra-
ditional common law rule for loans.2 And it should have been in lenders’ own 
interests to control defaults. 
Tragically, the events of 2008 proved this simple concept wrong. Market 
forces did not quell hazardous mortgage lending practices during the last housing 
bubble. Instead, we witnessed a repeat of an age-old pattern in which lenders 
relax credit standards when homes are appreciating on the bet that homes will sell 
for more than the loan balance if borrowers default. A vicious cycle is set in 
motion, as easy credit feeds the demand for homes, further accelerating rising 
home prices and intensifying the pressure for more loose credit. Ultimately, 
home prices overshoot market fundamentals and the bubble bursts. 
Historically, the worst financial crises have been due to real estate bubbles,3 
making the severity of the 2008 financial crisis discouragingly predictable. The 
events of 2008 precipitated the worst housing price slump in the nation since the 
1. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1411–12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639c (2012).
2. John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 177 (2011). Before 2011, Congress, some
state legislatures, and some regulators had adopted limited ability-to-repay rules for mortgages, but 
Dodd–Frank was the first time that Congress mandated such a rule for all residential mortgage lenders 
nationwide. See id. at 179–80, 182. 
3. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Great Depression and brought the global financial system to its knees.4 
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
STATES xvi (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ 
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2C6-7LD8] (“[I]t was the collapse of 
the housing bubble—fueled by low interest rates, easy and available credit, scant regulation, and toxic 
mortgages—that was the spark that ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 
2008.”). 
During 
the ensuing recession, 8.7 million U.S. workers lost their jobs,5 
Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 6, 
2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-great-recession [https:// 
perma.cc/4VCA-F7KU].
an estimated 5.8 
million homes were lost to foreclosure,6 and the net worth of the median house-
hold fell almost 40%.7 
Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 16–17 (2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf [https://perma.cc/BCQ6-8NDF].
To avoid a repeat of that catastrophe, Congress enacted the ability-to-repay/ 
qualified mortgage rule (ability-to-repay or ATR/QM rule).8 Traditionally, the 
ability-to-repay rule has been viewed narrowly as a consumer-protection mea-
sure, protecting borrowers from loans that are likely to put their homes at risk.9 
Less-appreciated is the key role that the ATR/QM rule plays in regulating hous-
ing bubbles and avoiding financial crises. 
In an acclaimed article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, law pro-
fessors Ryan Bubb and Prasad Krishnamurthy were the first to explore the signifi-
cance of the ability-to-repay rule to financial stability in depth.10 They placed 
justifiable importance on avoiding future housing bubbles and regulating sys-
temic risk.11 They concluded, however, that the ATR/QM rule is incapable of 
constraining bubbles because lenders will succumb to over-optimism when mar-
ket mania sets in and the rule will fail to dampen the over-lending.12 In their 
view, creditors will disregard the rule because they will dismiss the liability expo-
sure as negligible during bubbles.13 Instead, Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy 
advocate leverage limits to regulate housing bubbles.14 
4. 
5. 
 
6. Jonathan Spader & Christopher Herbert, Waiting for Homeownership: Assessing the Future of 
Homeownership, 2015–2035, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 267, 277 (2017). 
7. 
 
8. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1411–12, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1639c (2012). 
9. See, e.g., Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6415 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (describing 
ability-to-repay requirements as “consumer protections for mortgages” and the Qualified Mortgage 
provisions as “protecting consumers from unaffordable loans”). 
10. See Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage 
Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539 
(2015). 
11. See id. at 1545. 
12. See id. at 1628, 1630. 
13. See id. at 1548. 
14. See id. at 1610–22. Leverage limits cap the size of the total mortgage indebtedness on a home to a 
set percentage of home equity. The traditional leverage limit (also known as a loan-to-value or LTV 
limit) was 80%. 
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In this Article, we agree with Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy about the 
importance of preventing bubbles but depart in other key respects. Specifically, 
we argue that the ability-to-repay rule can be effective in limiting bubbles. Our 
analysis benefits from a landmark new empirical assessment of the ATR/QM 
rule’s effectiveness by its implementing agency, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau). This CFPB assessment was not available to 
Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy at the time of their article. We deploy this 
study, plus additional research findings, to conclude that lenders do comply with 
ability-to-repay requirements, even when the housing market may be overly opti-
mistic. We also conclude that far from easily overlooking or minimizing liability 
exposure (as Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy posit), lenders are acutely 
aware of liability risk. Plus, the ability-to-repay law is specifically designed to 
discourage lenders from ignoring this risk or from falling into untoward compla-
cency. Furthermore, ability-to-repay requirements result in a reduction in mort-
gage default rates under stressed economic conditions, redounding not only to the 
welfare of consumers, but also to financial stability writ large. 
Contrary to previous assertions, lenders do comply with ability-to-repay 
requirements, partly because, as we show, the ATR/QM rule is packed with 
objective requirements. These objective requirements force lenders to generate 
more hard data about their mortgage originations, which, in turn, facilitates over-
sight by investors and regulators.15 
See BEVERLY HIRTLE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., PUB. NO. 768, THE IMPACT OF 
SUPERVISION ON BANK PERFORMANCE 2 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/ 
staff_reports/sr768.html [https://perma.cc/C53M-4FCK] (concluding that more heavily supervised banks 
hold less risky loan portfolios). 
Lenders also comply with the ATR/QM rule due to its multiple mechanisms 
for oversight and enforcement. Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy focused on 
one such enforcement mechanism—statutory liability to borrowers for violations 
of the ability-to-repay provisions—but did not address the numerous other provi-
sions that enforce ATR/QM compliance. In their judgment, the statutory liability 
creating private exposure materializes too far off in the future to meaningfully 
deter lax underwriting.16 Although we take this concern seriously, the very exis-
tence of this provision appears to have a chilling impact today.17 
Moreover, numerous other oversight mechanisms ensure compliance with the 
rule. These include improved internal controls, regular federal examinations for 
compliance carrying stiff potential sanctions, regulatory circulars publicizing the 
rare violations, overlapping enforcement by state attorneys general, costly credit 
enhancements required by rating agencies, post-sale audits by federal investors, 
and liability to investors and guarantors for violations of representations and war-
ranties associated with the ability to repay. 
15. 
16. See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 10, at 1548, 1601–06. 
17. In recent years, mortgage lenders have mostly limited themselves to conservative loan products 
due to liability concerns, even as housing prices have risen steadily nationally since 2012. Consequently, 
the threat of liability does appear to exert deterrent force under current market conditions. See infra 
notes 226–30, 245–49, and accompanying text. 
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For these reasons, we argue that underestimating the ability-to-repay rule’s im-
portance to financial stability would be a serious mistake. To the contrary, the 
ability-to-repay rule is necessary to prevent a replay of the reckless loans that pre-
cipitated the 2008 crisis and to monitor bubble-like pricing behavior going for-
ward. Overturning or neutering the rule would pose a serious threat to financial 
stability. 
This issue has taken on fresh importance with the election of the 
Administration and its aggressive deregulatory campaign. As memories of the 
2008 financial crisis fade, critics have called for the repeal or replacement of 
the ATR/QM rule.18 Changes in CFPB leadership raise questions about the future 
contours of the ATR/QM rule. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department under 
Secretary Steven Mnuchin has steadily dismantled other important aspects of sys-
temic risk regulation.19 
For a description of these events, see Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, 
Why Dismantling Nonbank SIFI Regulation Is a Serious Mistake, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 19, 2018), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/12/19/why-dismantling-nonbank-sifi-regulation-is-a-serious- 
mistake/ [https://perma.cc/37WZ-BVYM].
Particularly in view of these developments and the new 
empirical evidence that has come to light concerning the rule’s efficacy, the time 
has come for a careful reassessment of the rule and its financial stability 
implications. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe why market forces will 
not curb lax loan underwriting during periods of rising home prices and the result-
ing danger to financial stability. Part II describes the loose credit practices that 
culminated in the 2008 crisis and that led to the 2010 passage of the ability-to- 
repay rule. Part III describes the workings of the ability-to-repay rule and its 
implementation. 
In Part IV, we present our central argument: the ability-to-repay rule is essen-
tial to financial stability. The empirical record shows that ability-to-repay require-
ments reduce mortgage defaults while eliciting lender compliance, even during 
incipient bubbles. Thus, the main behavioral critique of the rule—that lenders 
will disregard the rule due to myopia when housing prices skyrocket—is demon-
strably wrong. Instead, the ATR/QM rule can operate as a circuit breaker during 
incipient bubbles by preventing excessively risky mortgages from originating 
and thereby tamping down the rise in demand that fuels runaway home prices. 
This circuit breaker functions as an important safeguard to financial stability. 
Part V responds to criticisms of the rule and argues that proposals to roll back 
the rule are misguided. Some of those proposals—such as complete repeal and a 
return to market forces20
See Paul S. Willen, Evaluating Policies to Prevent Another Crisis: An Economist’s View 2, 4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20100, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w20100.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZPU-4DF4].
—exemplify amnesia about the breakdown in market 
discipline that produced the crisis. As we argue in Part VI, other proposals, such 
18. See, e.g., Edward J. Pinto, Repealing Dodd–Frank’s Qualified Mortgage and Qualified 
Residential Mortgage, in HERITAGE FOUND., THE CASE AGAINST DODD–FRANK: HOW THE “CONSUMER 
PROTECTION” LAW ENDANGERS AMERICANS 31, 31 (Norbert J. Michel ed., 2016). 
19. 
 
20. 
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as dropping the ATR/QM rule in favor of leverage limits alone, would nullify the 
proven beneficial effects of ability-to-repay requirements. 
Although addressing leverage is important, undermining the ATR/QM rule is 
not the answer. Loan-to-value (LTV) caps cannot stop a bubble because the de-
nominator, value, automatically rises with prices, which blunts a breach of the 
cap, and can be easily manipulated during a bubble. This can occur through 
inflated appraisals or by incurring added indebtedness as a home’s value soars in 
the form of second liens.21 As a result, LTV ratios can remain deceptively con-
stant even during a bubble, as they did during the subprime bubble in 2008. 
Instead, we argue that the ATR/QM rule provides crucial safeguards against bub-
bles that are not susceptible to such manipulation, and does so in a way that helps 
preserve access to credit. 
I. REAL ESTATE BUBBLES AND THEIR SYSTEMIC THREAT 
That lenders chronically relax lending standards during real estate booms 
when left to their own devices is well-known. Lax loan underwriting during prop-
erty bubbles endangers consumers and jeopardizes financial stability alike. This 
threat to financial stability is so grave that, historically, the worst financial crises 
have resulted from real estate bubbles financed through easy credit.22 
See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES, GENEVA 
REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 11: THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 32 
(2009), http://www.princeton.edu/�markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PPA- 
EWDU]; RICHARD J. HERRING & SUSAN M. WACHTER, GRP. OF THIRTY, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 58, 
REAL ESTATE BOOMS AND BANKING BUSTS—AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 23–54 (1999); CARMEN 
M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 
xliv–xlv, 158–62 (2009); Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary 
Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1029, 1032 (2012). 
Over the centuries, rising home prices have repeatedly gone hand-in-hand with 
loose credit23 because rapid home appreciation undermines private incentives to 
engage in sound mortgage underwriting, absent other constraints.24 In a rising 
price environment, delinquency rates are low because distressed borrowers can 
usually avoid default by refinancing their mortgages or retiring their loans 
through the sale of their homes. These low default rates, in turn, embolden market 
actors to cut lending standards. 
The bottom line is that mortgage lenders and investors are prone to loosen 
underwriting standards during periods of property value inflation.25 
Such deterioration occurred during the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis of 1996. See Yuliya 
Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 2–3 (Fed. Res. Bank of 
St. Louis Working Paper No. 2007-05, 2008), https://www.stlouisfed.org/�/media/files/pdfs/banking/ 
spa_2007_05.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/R46W-AQRF]. This also occurred in prior bubbles, such as in 
This tendency  
21. Second liens were difficult to monitor and remain so, although one of the current co-authors 
separately argues elsewhere for the importance of new monitoring mechanisms. See Adam J. Levitin & 
Susan M. Wachter, Second Liens and the Leverage Option, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1243 (2015). 
22. 
23. See sources cited supra note 22. 
24. See Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 14, 15 (1989); HERRING & WACHTER, supra note 22, at 11–12. 
25. 
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may reflect stratagem, myopia, or both.26 Myopia, for instance, can occur when 
market participants naively believe that the low prevailing default rates will per-
sist, even though price rises caused by unsustainable credit are what keep default 
rates low.27 Price escalation, resulting from lax lending, provides false confidence 
to myopic lenders of seemingly reduced collateral risk.28 
Other market actors may engage in cognitive dissonance by recognizing under-
writing risks while deceiving themselves into thinking that things will turn out for 
the better. Some lenders who consciously loosen standards may rationalize their 
actions by assuming that collateral values will rise indefinitely, thereby hiding 
their underwriting sins.29 
Other times, deteriorating lending standards can reflect strategic behavior. A 
rollback in credit standards offers distinct risks and rewards. The risks include 
higher eventual losses from elevated defaults.30 The rewards include higher lend-
ing volumes and higher commissions because broker and lender compensation is 
based on dollar volume and not on the eventual performance of the loans.31 
This prospect of higher compensation may induce strategic behavior. Lenders 
may resort to shoddy underwriting with eyes wide-open, recognizing the risk 
while managing it through conscious strategies. Adverse selection against invest-
ors in mortgage-backed securities—the subject of recent academic debate32—is  
the Asian Financial Crisis. See Susan Wachter, The Housing and Credit Bubbles in the United States and 
Europe: A Comparison, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 37, 39 (2015). 
26. See Nicholas C. Barberis, Psychology and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, in FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION: TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE? 15 (Michael Haliassos ed., 2012) (discussing competing 
behavioral theories of the 2008 financial crisis). 
27. Id. at 16. 
28. Id. at 17–18 (explaining how some market participants may extrapolate past price gains too far 
into the future). 
29. Id. at 20–21. 
30. This risk—known as credit risk or default risk—refers to the risk of nonpayment and can be 
measured by delinquencies, defaults, or foreclosures. A loan goes delinquent if a scheduled payment is 
not made by the due date. If a delinquency is not cured within a time period specified in the loan 
agreement—usually three to six months—the loan goes into default and becomes subject to collection. 
In the event of default, servicers have a contractual right to foreclose on the home and to recover the loss 
from the sale proceeds (subject to any loss-mitigation requirements). 
31. See Barberis, supra note 26, at 19. 
32. Compare Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from 
Subprime Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 307 (2010) (concluding that securitization practices during the period 
studied adversely affected the screening incentives of lenders) [hereinafter Keys et al., Did 
Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?], and Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage 
Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1449 (2009) 
(finding that risky mortgage lending in subprime zip codes was correlated with securitization of 
subprime loans), with Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from 
Credit Score Cutoff Rules, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 1 (2014) (disputing Keys et al.’s 2010 study). See 
also Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Why Housing?, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 5, 18–19 (2013) 
(“Why would the securitization desk want to tell the trading desk to stop buying PLS and thereby shut 
down their own business? . . . The true insiders—the securitization and CDO desks—pulled an inside 
job not just on outsiders but on their own firms as well.”). 
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one form of strategic behavior. Another strategy is market timing, in which lend-
ers or their loan officers exit the market before it crashes.33 
In one notorious example of successful market timing, Herbert and Marion Sandler—the founders 
of Golden West Financial Corp. and its negative amortization mortgage lender, World Savings—sold 
their company to Wachovia Bank for $24.2 billion in 2006. Carolyn Said, Why Sandlers Sold Their S&L/ 
Wachovia’s Deal for Golden West Called a Good Fit, SFGATE (May 9, 2006, 4:00 AM), https://www. 
sfgate.com/business/article/Why-Sandlers-sold-their-S-L-Wachovia-s-deal-for-2497431.php [https:// 
perma.cc/3CQ7-JY4B]. The disastrous World Savings loans that Wachovia acquired contributed to 
Wachovia’s later demise in the fall of 2008. See Floyd Norris, A Bank Is Survived by Its Loans, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 14, 2009), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/business/economy/ 
15norris.html.
Regardless of whether myopia or moral hazard (or both) explain the phenom-
enon, mortgage underwriting standards historically drop during housing bubbles. 
Further, when housing prices are rising, other market constraints on lending risk 
are prone to break down.34 Property appraisals do not curb risk because home 
appreciation buoys market comparables, which then are used as appraised val-
ues.35 Similarly, absent other constraints, lenders may ignore standard recourse 
clauses in their securitization deals either because (myopically) they perceive no 
risk of recourse or (strategically) they cause their entities to be thinly 
capitalized.36 
As credit eases, borrowed funds pour into the real estate market, artificially 
feeding demand and, with it, property values.37 Home values are then prone to 
inflate because lenders and investors cannot observe how much total credit risk 
has accumulated in the system.38 
At some point, the cycle heads down after credit constraints ease to such a 
degree that further easing no longer stimulates demand at the same pace. Then, 
housing prices decelerate, and the capitalization of expected price gains into 
house prices reverses. Lending based on existing collateral values comes into 
question, and lenders stop extending credit based on the expectation of constant 
or increasing price rises. The price and credit bubble is followed by a price and 
credit bust. 
There are four reasons why housing bubbles are particularly harmful to finan-
cial stability. First, most homes are purchased on credit granted by banks or non-
bank lenders, which are both vulnerable to financial contagion. Second, there are 
33. 
 
34. See Richard Herring & Susan Wachter, Bubbles in Real Estate Markets, in ASSET PRICE 
BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 217, 217– 
18, 221 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 1st MIT Press Paperback ed. 2005). 
35. See HERRING & WACHTER, supra note 22, at 13, 19–20. 
36. See Patricia A. McCoy & Susan Wachter, Representations and Warranties: Why They Did Not 
Stop the Crisis, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 289, 302–04, 308 (Lee 
Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017). We emphasize the words “absent other constraints.” As 
we discuss below, lenders are now more likely to pay close attention to recourse clauses, having paid 
large recent settlements and judgments for violating those clauses. This represents a change from before 
the crisis. See infra note 255. 
37. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Fraudulent Income Overstatement on Mortgage Applications During 
the Credit Expansion of 2002 to 2005, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1831, 1832–34, 1841–43 (2017). 
38. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 32, at 18–19; Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, 
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1184, 1189, 1254 (2012). 
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no effective strategies for restraining housing bubbles by short-selling homes. 
Third, the debt overhang when prices correct means that households are not just 
illiquid, but also insolvent. Finally, the main technique for resolving loan defaults 
involves dumping foreclosed homes onto the sales market, which intensifies the 
collapse in home values. 
Turning to the first reason, most homebuyers lack the wealth to pay for such a 
large asset in cash and finance the purchase through credit.39 As a result, the fi-
nancial health of the banks and nonbank firms that extend mortgage credit 
depends on successful loan repayment. If a housing bubble ensues and bursts, 
inflicting loan losses, the banks’ solvency will hang in the balance.40 Because it is 
difficult to rapidly liquidate these illiquid, long-term assets at full book value, a 
run on deposits can jeopardize bank solvency.41 Meanwhile, nonbank lenders ei-
ther have little capital or rely on banks’ capitalization, making these thinly capi-
talized entities particularly at-risk.42 Because the bubble burst affects mortgage 
lenders across the board, losses are correlated and distributed in unknown ways, 
making lenders suspect and susceptible to run-inducing fears.43 
This phenomenon has systemic implications because bank runs can spread into 
panics that can topple other banks.44 Counterparty exposure is one key channel 
through which bank panics spread.45 In the commercial banking sector, counter-
party exposure arises from the web of interbank loans, reciprocal deposit 
accounts, and the payments system that link banks.46 Further, commercial banks 
are not the only firms that are vulnerable to panics, as the 2008 financial crisis 
showed. In 2008, shadow banking firms, including investment banks and credit 
default swap issuers, experienced financial contagion through the counterparty 
channel as well. For example, numerous shadow banking firms depended on 
short-term, demand-like financing (such as repurchasing agreements) that 
exposed those firms to runs while inflicting losses on their counterparties (includ-
ing commercial banks).47 
See Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: 
Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455 (2019); ZOLTAN 
POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., PUB. NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 11–12 (2012), https:// 
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9RU- 
SFHZ]. The term “repos” refers to repurchase agreements, which are contracts in which the seller of a 
Counterparty exposure also spread through the 
39. See Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, What Is Systemic Risk?, 45 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 
121, 123 (2013); Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, Why Cyclicality Matters to Access to 
Mortgage Credit, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 361, 363 (2017). 
40. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 39, at 361–62; see also Allen & Carletti, supra note 39, at 125 
(discussing “risk of contagion” in the context of bank lending during housing bubbles). 
41. See Douglas W. Diamond, Banks and Liquidity Creation: A Simple Exposition of the Diamond- 
Dybvig Model, 93 ECON. Q. 189, 196, 199 (2007). 
42. See You Suk Kim et al., Liquidity Crises in the Mortgage Market, 2018 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON 
ECON. ACTIVITY 347, 347–50. 
43. See Susan Wachter, Comment by Susan Wachter, 2018 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 
420, 420–22 (providing Professor Susan Wachter’s commentary on the article). 
44. See Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1275–77 (2013). 
45. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2012, at 20 (2012). 
46. See Judge, supra note 44, at 1275–76. 
47.  
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security agrees to repurchase the security from the buyer at a higher price, often on an overnight basis. 
Repurchase agreements are the functional equivalent of short-term loans to sellers of securities. See 
What Is a Repo?, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASSOC, https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market- 
Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/icma-ercc-publications/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/1-what- 
is-a-repo/ [https://perma.cc/3DW7-3ZLY] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
proliferation of credit-linked derivatives—notably mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps—because the financial 
performance of those instruments relied heavily on full and timely repayment of 
the underlying residential mortgages.48 
Asset liquidation upon recognition of losses is another transmission channel 
for financial contagion.49 Systemic failures can spread when distressed finan-
cial firms liquidate assets for cash to pay their creditors. If fire sales depress the 
values of those assets, other financial firms holding the same asset classes will 
sustain losses, with a concomitant hit to capital.50 Capital depletion and any 
bank failures that ensue will cause credit to contract, inflicting serious eco-
nomic harm in the form of an industrial downturn, job loss, depressed con-
sumer demand, and ultimately a recession.51 This is particularly the case 
because the main way to dispose of formerly owned single-family homes is to 
go through a foreclosure process and sell them unoccupied into an oversold 
market, as discussed below. 
The second reason housing bubbles pose systemic risk is due to the lack of 
effective short-sale strategies to rein in home prices.52 When home prices over-
shoot economic fundamentals, it is impossible for homeowners to sell their 
homes with any assurance of buying them back when property prices subside. 
Similarly, investors cannot sell homes that they do not own.53 Unlike commod-
ities, which are fungible in nature, the unique character of individual homes 
makes short selling impossible. This is the fundamental incompleteness of the 
housing market that makes it susceptible to bubbles in ways that other asset mar-
kets avoid, as short sellers in other markets make money from balancing myopic 
and exuberant pricing pressures with selling pressures, recouping gains when  
48.  See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 43–54, 58–61, 67–68 (2011). 
49. Allen & Carletti, supra note 39, at 122–25; see also Kress et al., supra note 47. 
50. See Allen & Carletti, supra note 39, at 125; George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is 
Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 377 (2003). 
51. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 318– 
19 (1936). 
52. See Susan M. Wachter, Informed Securitization, in PRINCIPLES OF HOUSING FINANCE REFORM 
209, 210–11 (Susan M. Wachter & Joseph Tracy eds., 2016); Barberis, supra note 26, at 16. Although 
some investors devised ways to short mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations 
during the run-up to 2008, those deals increased the amount of leveraged lending, and neither caused 
mortgage-lending-default premia (adjusted for risk) to rise nor prices of mortgage-backed securities, 
credit default swaps, or the underlying mortgages to fall. See McCoy & Wachter, supra note 39, at 366; 
Levitin & Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, supra note 38, at 1243–49. In fact, the pricing of the 
put option adjusted for risk continued to fall throughout the bubble. See id. at 1203–06. 
53. Wachter, supra note 52, at 210–11. 
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prices inevitably fall. In the case of housing, prices do inevitably fall, but they fall 
too late, such that no one will be able to gain from selling the bubble short.54 
Third, even after homes correctly reprice, borrowing by the household sector is 
suppressed. After a housing bubble bursts and home prices drop, indebted home-
owners may not have enough home equity left to satisfy the collateral requirements 
for additional loans. Tighter credit standards—resulting from the now-decapital-
ized banks’ withdrawal of lending—may likewise preclude those households from 
refinancing their mortgages to get a lower interest rate. This inability to borrow 
more money will cause those households to cut back on spending.55 
Finally, housing bubbles threaten financial stability because the leading 
method for resolving distressed home loans—eviction through foreclosure— 
pushes vacant houses on the real estate market.56 Each fresh glut of deteriorating 
properties places more downward pressure on home values and sets a vicious 
cycle in motion as more and more distressed borrowers fall into negative equity 
and go into default.57 
The ATR/QM rule’s nexus to this narrative involves the expansion of credit 
during the inflationary period of the housing cycle. In order to maintain loan vol-
umes and fee revenues as home prices heat up, originators have to expand the 
pool of eligible borrowers. They do so by qualifying weaker loan applicants 
through the use of lax underwriting techniques and high-risk, nontraditional loan 
products.58 
See infra Part II. Nontraditional mortgage products include hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages and 
non-fully amortizing mortgages (most notably interest-only, negative amortization, and balloon loans). 
Jane K. Dokko et al., Affordability, Financial Innovation, and the Start of the Housing Boom 2 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2019-01, 2019), https://www.chicagofed.org/�/media/ 
publications/working-papers/2019/wp2019-01-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA4U-P23H].
More of these applicants, when approved, will be unable to repay their 
mortgage loans. In the process, the growth in high-risk loan features and easy 
credit increases the demand for homes, buoying property values while ramping 
up systemic risk. The next Part describes how this dynamic played out in the 
lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis. 
II. THE EVENTS PRECIPITATING PASSAGE OF THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE 
The genesis of the ability-to-repay rule dates back to the 2000s, when risky 
underwriting practices and novel mortgage products proliferated, setting the stage 
for the later spike in mortgage defaults that triggered the 2008 crisis. From 2002 
through 2006, U.S. home prices rose, making it harder for lenders to qualify 
54. Of course, it is possible to evade the consequences of the bubble by cash-out refinancing through 
the default option, but rather than containing the bubble, this just adds more leverage, causing more 
financial contagion. 
55. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT 
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 50–51 (2014). 
56. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 32, at 6, 20. 
57. See Bernanke & Gertler, supra note 24, at 28; Levitin & Wachter, supra note 32, at 6, 20; see also 
Arthur Acolin, Xudong An, Raphael W. Bostic & Susan M. Wachter, Homeownership and 
Nontraditional and Subprime Mortgages, 27 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 393, 406 (2017) (demonstrating 
the inverse relationship between pre-recession subprime lending and post-recession homeownership). 
58. 
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homebuyers for mortgages based on strict, conventional underwriting criteria.59 
Lenders responded by resorting to questionable practices to expand the group of 
applicants who were eligible for costlier homes.60 
One such practice was lender use of low-documentation loans—in which lend-
ers accepted borrowers’ income, job, and assets as stated, without verification or 
documentation.61 Another was offering borrowers nontraditional mortgage prod-
ucts with less than fully amortizing terms, such as balloon loans, interest-only 
loans, option-pay loans, and negative amortization mortgages.62 These products 
offered lower initial payments than traditional fixed-rate loans because payments 
during the first few years of the loan did not fully amortize principal.63 When 
lenders judged applicants’ ability to repay based on the lower initial payments 
alone—which occurred during the boom—these nontraditional products made it 
easier to qualify applicants for loans.64 During the housing bubble, lenders further 
59. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-78R, INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC AND MARKET 
DEVELOPMENTS 37 (2007) [hereinafter INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS] 
(noting an easing of underwriting standards); Dokko et al., supra note 58, at 30 fig.1 (depicting national 
home price appreciation over that period). 
60. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 104–05; Dokko et al., supra note 58, 
at 4. 
61. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 110–11; INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 5, 42–43; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 36–37; see 
also Michael LaCour-Little & Jing Yang, Taking the Lie Out of Liar Loans: The Effect of Reduced 
Documentation on the Performance and Pricing of Alt-A and Subprime Mortgages, 35 J. REAL EST. 
RES. 507, 519–20 & exh.2 (2013). 
62. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 105, 111 (discussing the growth of 
nontraditional mortgage products leading up to the financial crisis); INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 5, 45 (depicting expansion of nontraditional mortgage 
products from 2000–2006); Andrew Davidson, Alex Levin, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, 
Why Are Aggressive Mortgage Products Bad for the Housing Market?, 84 J. ECON. & BUS. 148, 150 
fig.1 (2016) (depicting the growth of non-agency origination volumes from 2000–2007); Dokko et al., 
supra note 58, at 30 fig.1, 33 fig.4 (depicting expansion of nontraditional mortgage products from 2000– 
2010). Mortgage rates did not adjust to reflect added risk. See Adam J. Levitin, Desen Lin & Susan M. 
Wachter, Mortgage Risk Premiums During the Housing Bubble, 59 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 1, 14–16 
(2019). 
63. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 106, 108; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, 
at 34–35; Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 123, 143–46 (2007). Although option-pay loans offered borrowers the choice of making fully 
amortizing payments every month, many option-pay borrowers instead made lower payments. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 106; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 35. 
Extended-term products such as forty-year mortgages and hybrid ARMs were also used to the same 
effect. See Dokko et al., supra note 58, at 33 fig.4. Many extended-term mortgages and hybrid ARMs 
did fully amortize principal. But extended-term loans lowered monthly payments by lengthening the 
loan term from its traditional thirty years, whereas hybrid ARMs did so by offering a low fixed-interest 
rate for the first two or three years, after which the interest rate would float. See FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 105–06; INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE 
TRENDS, supra note 59, at 40; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 34–35; see also Kristine M. Young, 
The Aging Population and Maturing Mortgage Loans: Ensuring a Secure Financial Lifeline for the 
Elderly Through Mortgage Lending, 16 ELDER L.J. 477, 484–85 (2008). 
64. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 106; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, 
at 37. 
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relaxed the maximum debt-to-income (DTI) ratios needed to qualify for mortgage 
loans.65 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 105; INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 42–43; see also Daniel L. Greenwald, The Mortgage 
Credit Channel of Macroeconomic Transmission 9–12, 10 fig.2, 72 fig.B.5 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, New York University), https://bcf.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/DG-Paper- 
mortgage_credit_channel_nov_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA7S-YCNQ]. DTI limits place a cap on the 
ratio of an applicant’s total monthly debt payments to his or her monthly income. Greenwald refers to 
DTI ratios as payment-to-income (PTI) ratios. See id. at 2 n.1. 
Originators combined these techniques for expanding the eligible applicant 
pool for mortgages with other liberal credit practices that ratcheted up credit 
risk.66 They qualified applicants with blemished, weaker credit for higher priced 
subprime loans.67 
See INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 2; 
Davidson et al., supra note 62, at 150–51 figs.1–2. Subprime mortgages were higher-priced mortgages, 
ostensibly designed for less creditworthy borrowers. What Is a Subprime Mortgage?, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-subprime- 
mortgage-en-110/ [https://perma.cc/ZUK3-LWQM].
In some cases, they relaxed combined loan-to-value ratio 
requirements when approving home loans backed by junior liens, either when 
extending the first mortgage or later. Doing so reduced homeowners’ equity (and 
any needed down payment) at the inception of the loan or after origination, which 
was difficult if not impossible to monitor in real time.68 
As applicants strained to buy higher cost homes, nontraditional mortgages, ad-
justable-rate loans, and loans with high DTI ratios and scant documentation 
surged out of control and crowded out safer, traditionally underwritten loans.69 
By the bubble’s height in 2006, low-documentation loans accounted for about 
two-thirds of prime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), four-fifths of Alt-A 
ARMs,70 and almost half of subprime ARMs.71 Negative amortization and 
interest-only loans gained market share at the expense of old-fashioned, fully 
amortizing loans, growing from less than 5% of nonprime originations in 2001 to 
65. 
66. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 111; INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT 
AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 47; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 34–37. 
67. 
 
68. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 105, 109–10; INFORMATION ON RECENT 
DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 38–39; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 35– 
36; Greenwald, supra note 65, at 73 fig.B.6. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio divides the loan principal by 
the value of the property. Combined LTV (CLTV) ratios divide the principal size of all outstanding 
loans secured by the home by the property’s value. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 21, at 1272–84, 
for a discussion of why CLTVs are not monitored by first-lien lenders. Despite their interest in the 
additional risk imposed by second liens, first-lien lenders lack the power to act. Id. at 1281. CLTVs did 
substantially increase in the run-up to the crisis, whereas LTVs did not. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 
32, at 13 tbl.1. 
69. See Davidson et al., supra note 62, at 150 & fig.1; Dokko et al., supra note 58, at 2; INFORMATION 
ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 40–43; Greenwald, supra note 65, at 
9–12, 10 fig.2, 72 fig.B.5; Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov & Susan M. Wachter, Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 
1330–31, 1331 fig.1 (2009). 
70. The term “Alt-A” referred to mortgages issued to borrowers with stronger credit scores, based on 
reduced documentation underwriting or on high DTI ratios. See Sumit Agarwal & Calvin T. Ho, 
Comparing the Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets, CHI. FED LETTER, Aug. 2007, at 2. 
71. McCoy, Pavlov & Wachter, supra note 69, at 1339 fig.3. 
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over half by the end of 2005.72 Together, these classes of loans saddled the finan-
cial system with added risk while they increased the demand for homes and 
pushed housing prices even higher.73 Importantly, lenders and investors did not 
require greater compensation for this additional risk.74 
When the housing bubble burst and home values fell nationally starting in the first 
quarter of 2007,75 the dangers of these lending practices became apparent. Most of 
these practices raised questions about borrowers’ ability to repay. Low-documenta-
tion loans, for example, disregarded borrowers’ actual cash flow and were an open 
invitation to fraud.76 Nontraditional mortgage products and adjustable-rate loans 
(including negatively amortizing, so-called option-pay ARMs), posed potential pay-
ment shock because after the initial introductory period, borrowers’ monthly pay-
ments could go up.77 Borrowers with blemished credit had a track record of not 
paying their bills. Meanwhile, high DTI ratios raised concerns over whether the 
affected borrowers’ debt service obligations were manageable. 
During the halcyon years, rising home values masked the dangers of these 
loans. While housing prices were climbing, borrowers who had difficulty making 
their payments could usually avoid default because their home equity had 
increased.78 This housing appreciation, along with the continued availability of 
loose credit, allowed many to pay off their loans by refinancing their mortgages. 
If all else failed, the same increase in home values allowed borrowers to sell their 
homes for enough money to retire their loans.79 
The sharp decline in home prices starting in early 200780 wiped out equity and 
took these options off the table for many troubled borrowers. Lenders refused to 
refinance homeowners whose loans were “underwater” (those who owed more on 
their mortgages than their houses were worth). Nor could affected homeowners 
72. See id. at 1331 & fig.1; Yuliya Demyanyk & Yadav K. Gopalan, Subprime ARMs: Popular 
Loans, Poor Performance, BRIDGES, Spring 2007, at 4 fig.1. Numerous interest-only and negative 
amortization loans had adjustable-rate terms, which accounted for the overlap in the market shares of 
those categories. See Kelly D. Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in the United States: 
A Perfect Storm, 92 FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 115, 128–29, 129 chart 5 (2007). 
73. Davidson et al., supra note 62, at 149; Greenwald, supra note 65, at 4. 
74. Levitin, Lin & Wachter, supra note 62, at 2. 
75. Dokko et al., supra note 58, at 30 fig.1; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 70. 
76. As one group of economists observed: 
Dropping the important verification step from the underwriting process opens the mortgage 
window to large numbers of borrowers who would not qualify ordinarily. Unobservable bor-
rower quality could drop precipitously and investors would be unaware for months or years 
before worsening performance became high enough to reveal that a significant change in 
borrower quality had occurred.  
Charles D. Anderson et al., Deconstructing a Mortgage Meltdown: A Methodology for Decomposing 
Underwriting Quality, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 609, 625–26 (2011). 
77. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 42; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 4, at 106– 
09. Payment shock is the risk of being unable to make mortgage payments if the payments do go up. See 
McCoy, supra note 63, at 133–34. 
78. INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 32. 
79. Id. 
80. Dokko et al., supra note 58, at 30 fig.1. 
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sell their homes for enough to pay off their loans.81 As home prices fell, delin-
quencies soared and increasing numbers of borrowers tipped into default.82 
Mortgage Delinquency Rates (Left Scale) and House Price Appreciation (Right Scale), RUSSELL 
SAGE FOUND., http://www.russellsage.org/research/chartbook/mortgage-delinquency-rates-left-scale- 
and-house-price-appreciation-right-scale [http://perma.cc/TAL5-2XBE] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
When the dust settled, loans with lax underwriting or nontraditional loan fea-
tures experienced higher default rates than traditionally underwritten prime fixed- 
rate loans. A high combined loan-to-value ratio, a non-amortizing or negative 
amortization term,83 reduced documentation, a low credit score, and the presence 
of a prepayment penalty each significantly raised the chance that a loan would 
become seriously delinquent.84 
See INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 25–26, 46; 
see also MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, THE SKINNY ON SKIN IN THE GAME 
(2011) (non-amortizing mortgages); Anderson et al., supra note 76, at 627 (reduced documentation 
loans); Michelle A. Danis & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Delinquency of Subprime Mortgages, 60 J. 
ECON. & BUS. 67, 78 (2008) (prepayment penalties); Yuliya S. Demyanyk, Quick Exits of Subprime 
Mortgages, 91 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 79, 81 (2009) (credit score, CLTV ratio, mortgage 
interest rate, and house-price appreciation); Floros & White, supra note 83, at 95–96 & tbl.5 (interest- 
only loans and balloon loans); Wei Jiang et al., Liar’s Loan? Effects of Loan Origination Channel and 
Information Falsification on Mortgage Delinquency, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 7 (2014) (reduced 
documentation loans); LaCour-Little & Yang, supra note 61, at 519–20 & exh.2, 529 (reduced 
documentation loans); Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 
37–40, 42–44 (2009) (reduced documentation underwriting); Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, 
The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed Rate Mortgages, 38 REAL EST. ECON. 399, 402 (2010) 
(hybrid 2/28 ARMs); Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime 
Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments, 18 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 311, 311 (2007) (balloon loans and prepayment penalties); Morgan J. Rose, Origination 
Channel, Prepayment Penalties and Default, 40 REAL EST. ECON. 662, 662 (2012) (prepayment 
penalties); Morgan J. Rose, Predatory Lending Practices and Subprime Foreclosures: Distinguishing 
Impacts by Loan Category, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 13, 15 (2008) (prepayment penalties); John Y. Campbell 
& Joa˜o F. Cocco, A Model of Mortgage Default 59, fig.6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17516, 2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w17516.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VF-C238] 
(negative amortization and interest-only loans); Yuliya Demyanyk et al., Determinants and 
Consequences of Mortgage Default 11–16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-19, 
2011) (credit scores) (on file with authors); Ronel Elul et al., What “Triggers” Mortgage Default? 11, tbl.1 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 10-13, 2010) (credit scores and non- 
amortizing mortgages), http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/�souleles/research/papers/PhilaFedwp10-13.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X5TD-959B]; Shane M. Sherlund, The Past, Present, and Future of Subprime Mortgages 
10 & tbl.5 (Divs. of Research and Statistics & Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 
2008-63, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200863/200863pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L2YC-72R3] (non-amortizing mortgages). 
Adjustable-rate loans experienced higher default 
rates than fixed-rate loans.85 Mortgages that combined two or more of those risk 
features posed an even higher risk of delinquency.86 
81. INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 32. 
82. 
83. Here, we use the term “non-amortizing” to refer to interest-only loans and balloon loans. Both 
permutations plus negative amortization terms significantly add to default risk. See Ioannis Floros & 
Joshua T. White, Qualified Residential Mortgages and Default Risk, 70 J. BANKING & FIN. 86, 95, 96 
tbl.5 (2016). 
84. 
85. INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 26; Brent W. 
Ambrose et al., A Note on Hybrid Mortgages, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 765, 768 (2005). 
86. See INFORMATION ON RECENT DEFAULT AND FORECLOSURE TRENDS, supra note 59, at 47; 
Kristopher S. Gerardi et al., Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 109, 112 & exh.15.2 (Robert W. Kolb 
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The high default rates that these nonconforming loan features and practices 
presented raised obvious consumer-protection concerns. Beyond that, those high 
default rates spawned grave systemic risk.87 The unraveling of lending standards 
in the mid-2000s epitomized exactly the type of credit-fueled real estate bubbles 
that have accounted for the worst financial crises for centuries. 
III. THE ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE 
In 2010, Congress acted to prevent a repeat of the lending excesses of the hous-
ing bubble by mandating the ability-to-repay rule in section 1411 of the Dodd– 
Frank Act.88 Under that provision, creditors may not extend residential mortgage 
loans unless they make a reasonable and good faith determination of the bor-
rowers’ ability to repay: 
In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Bureau, no creditor may 
make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and 
good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, 
at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to 
repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance 
(including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.89 
Federally insured depository institutions must also meet the minimum residential 
lending standards imposed by their federal prudential regulators.90 
Originally, the ATR/QM rule gave the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System authority to adopt the implementing regulations.91 On July 21, 
ed., 2010); CLIFFORD V. ROSSI, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUSING AM., ANATOMY OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES IN THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 34 (2010) (noting that in an option- 
pay ARM, “[t]he combination of reduced FICO together with a simultaneous second lien, a higher loan 
amount and stated income, stated asset documentation presents incremental default risk beyond the 
individual risk factors”); Shirish Chinchalkar & Roger M. Stein, Comparing Loan-Level and Pool-Level 
Mortgage Portfolio Analysis 20 (Moody’s Research Labs, Working Paper No. 2010-11-1, 2010) (“In the 
mortgage setting, research suggests that the relationship between, e.g., default probability and loan 
factors is non-linear, and in some cases highly so . . . .”); Shane M. Sherlund, Mortgage Defaults 2–3 & 
fig.2 (Mar. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (noting that a report prepared by 
Amherst Securities for the Securities & Exchange Commission concluded that “[n]egative equity and 
the layering of risk are the largest components of default across mortgage products”). 
87. Although it may seem obvious, the serious systemic risk posed by these high-risk, private-label 
mortgage products and underwriting practices is not universally acknowledged. The GSEs mostly 
insured conforming loans and these loans defaulted at far lower rates than nonconforming, private-label 
securitized mortgages. But this fact has not prevented the widespread narrative that the GSE lending 
practices were responsible for the housing bubble. See Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: How Government 
Housing Policy Failed Homeowners and Taxpayers and Led to the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 
74, 77 (2013) (written testimony of Susan M. Wachter). 
88. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1411, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a) 
(2012); see also id. § 1639(b) (the qualified mortgage (QM) provision). 
89. Id. § 1639c(a)(1). 
90. See id. § 1639c rule of construction. 
91. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1061(b)(1), 1400(c); 
Amendments Relating to Small Creditors and Rural or Underserved Areas Under the Truth in Lending 
Act (Regulation Z), 80 Fed. Reg. 59,944, 59,945 (Oct. 2, 2015) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
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2011, however, the Board’s jurisdiction over the rule transferred to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).92 In January 2013, the Bureau 
promulgated a final regulation implementing the ATR/QM provisions and the 
regulation took effect on January 10, 2014.93 
The ATR/QM rule has two parts, one mandatory and one discretionary in na-
ture.94 The mandatory part of the rule establishes threshold standards governing 
virtually all home mortgages.95 These standards apply to home loans regardless 
of regulator, location, or charter and require, among other things, full documenta-
tion underwriting and consideration of potential payment shock. We refer to these 
standards as the “ability-to-repay requirements” in their narrow sense. Lenders 
who violate these standards (plus certain assignees) can be liable to borrowers 
and may face government enforcement.96 
Id. §§ 1640–41; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND QUALIFIED MORTGAGE 
RULE ASSESSMENT REPORT 36–37 (2019) [hereinafter CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT], https://s3.amazonaws. 
com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ability-to-repay-qualified-mortgage_assessment-report. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/TN8B-8YEA].
In the second part of the rule, Congress gave lenders an option of making loans 
containing even stronger safety features.97 Loans that meet these safety require-
ments are known as “qualified mortgages” (QMs).98 All other mortgages are clas-
sified as nonqualified mortgages (non-QMs). 
QM and non-QM loans alike require lenders to ascertain the borrowers’ repay-
ment capacity.99 In addition, QM loans must avoid certain risky loan terms.100 As 
the quid pro quo, lenders receive a presumption of compliance with the ability- 
to-repay requirements for the QM loans that they make.101 In contrast, Congress 
permitted non-QM loans to have nontraditional loan terms, including negative 
amortization, interest-only payments, or balloon clauses, in order to preserve con-
sumer choice.102 But because non-QM loans pose higher default risk on average, 
those loans offer no presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay require-
ments in private rights of action for violation of the ability-to-repay rule.103 
A. THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY REQUIREMENTS 
The ability-to-repay rule has one overarching command: that lenders must 
make a reasonable and good faith determination of loan applicants’ ability to  
92. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1061(b)(1), 1400(c). 
93. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation 
Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a), (b). 
95. Id. § 1639c(a). 
96. 
 
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b). 
98. Id. § 1639c(b)(2)(A). 
99. See id. § 1639c. 
100. See id. § 1639c(b). 
101. See id. 
102. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 44. 
103. See infra Section III.B. 
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repay before they can extend home mortgage credit.104 
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1). The ability-to-repay requirements only apply to first- or second-lien 
closed-end residential mortgage loans that are made for consumer purposes and are secured by a 
dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(a) (2019); id. § 1026.43(a)-1 cmt. They do not apply to reverse 
mortgages, construction loans, home-equity lines of credit, temporary bridge loans, or time-share 
arrangements. See id. § 1026.43(a); LAURENCE E. PLATT ET AL., BLOOMBERG LAW, THE STATE OF PLAY 
OF QUALIFIED AND NON-QUALIFIED MORTGAGES 2 (2018), https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/ 
perspectives-events/publications/2018/05/the-state-of-play-of-qualified-and-nonqualified-mo/files/ 
download-document/fileattachment/the-state-of-play-180514.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG27-PKCM].
This text is couched as a 
standard, prompting some to criticize the rule as easy to evade because it seem-
ingly gives originators wide discretion when determining applicants’ repayment 
capacity.105 
This criticism ignores that Congress operationalized the meaning of the term 
“reasonable and good faith determination” of ability to repay by placing multiple 
objective constraints on originators’ latitude. These constraints did not come out 
of nowhere. Congress mandated these constraints to prevent the underwriting 
lapses that culminated in the 2008 financial crisis.106 
Mapping the constraints embedded in the ability-to-repay requirements onto 
the abuses that preceded the crisis illuminates how carefully Congress tailored 
the rule to prevent a repeat of the last mortgage lending bubble. The ability- 
to-repay requirements place bright-line restrictions on mortgage underwriting 
practices, most notably by banning reduced documentation underwriting and 
qualifying borrowers without regard to payment shock. 
1. Determinations Must Be Based on Documented and Verified Information 
In one of its most powerful provisions, the ability-to-repay rule states that all 
repayment determinations must be “based on verified and documented informa-
tion.”107 Specifically, creditors “shall verify” the “amounts of income or assets” 
being relied on to determine repayment ability, “including expected income or 
assets.”108 
15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(4) (listing additional types of acceptable third-party 
records). Contrary to an erroneous assertion made by the U.S. Department of Treasury, the CFPB allows 
creditors to base their ability-to-repay determinations on an applicant’s verified assets alone, and not on 
income, where the assets are sufficient to repay the loan. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 94 (2017) 
(stating that Appendix Q “ignores borrower assets, which restricts lending to borrowers whose income is low 
and fixed”), with Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS, Spring 2017, at 6–7 [hereinafter 
CFPB SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS Spring 2017], https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
documents/201704_cfpb_Supervisory-Highlights_Issue-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUT9-U5LJ] (noting that 
ability to repay can be based on assets other than the dwelling). 
Furthermore, the rule specifies exactly what that documentation and 
verification must contain. To verify, a lender must review “third-party documents 
that provide reasonably reliable evidence of the consumer’s income or assets,”  
104. 
 
105. See, e.g., Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 10, at 1594 & n.204. 
106. See supra Part II. 
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1)–(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(3)(i), (c)(4). 
108. 
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such as an “Internal Revenue Service Form W–2, tax returns, payroll receipts, 
[or] financial institution records.”109 
The ability-to-repay rule flatly prohibits reduced documentation underwriting 
going forward. It comes as no surprise that low-documentation loans were one of 
the biggest default drivers because, under the “double-trigger” theory of default, 
low home equity is not enough to result in default for non-strategic borrowers.110 
Instead, defaulting homeowners must normally also suffer an economic shock— 
such as job loss, illness, or divorce—that makes it impossible to repay a loan.111 
Borrowers with loan amounts due that exceeded the value of their home often did not go into 
default. See, e.g., Chester Foster & Robert Van Order, An Option-Based Model of Mortgage Default, 3 
HOUSING FIN. REV. 351, 351 (1984); Kerry D. Vandell, How Ruthless Is Mortgage Default? A Review 
and Synthesis of the Evidence, 6 J. HOUSING RES. 245, 245 (1995); Elul et al., supra note 84, at 2. The 
experience of 2008 demonstrated that the rate of strategic default was low and that negative equity was 
not enough alone for most homeowners to stop making their loan payments. See Neil Bhutta et al., The 
Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions 2–3 (Divs. of Research & Statistics & 
Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010), https://www.federalreserve. 
gov/pubs/feds/2010/201035/201035pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6PF-CEJT].
A loan that disregards a borrower’s actual ability to pay puts the borrower in a 
precarious position and increases his or her chance of default as a result of an eco-
nomic shock.112 Accordingly, the ATR/QM rule’s documentation and verification 
provisions place a serious bright-line constraint on one of the most important 
causes of the loan defaults resulting in the 2008 crisis. 
These documentation and verification requirements further give teeth to other 
provisions in the ATR/QM rule requiring mortgage lenders to take DTI ratios 
into account113 and capping DTI ratios at 43% for General Qualified 
Mortgages.114 Before the rule’s adoption, it was easy to falsify DTI ratios by 
inflating the borrower’s income. Today’s documentation and verification require-
ments prevent that practice, making DTI ratios a meaningful constraint on over-
heated demand for houses. 
2. Originators Must Consider Enumerated Factors When Determining Ability to 
Repay 
Just as lenders must now use full documentation underwriting, they must also 
take specific statutory factors into account when evaluating repayment ability. 
Dodd–Frank enumerated a long list of factors that lenders must consider in  
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(3)–(c)(4) (noting that creditors must 
verify information using third-party records); id. § 1026.43(c)(3)-1 cmt. (adding that records must be 
specific to the individual). 
110. See Davidson et al., supra note 62, at 158; Floros & White, supra note 83, at 95, 96 tbl.5; 
LaCour-Little & Yang, supra note 61, at 528; Mian & Sufi, supra note 37, at 1834, 1847; Pennington- 
Cross & Ho, supra note 84, at 399. Low-documentation loans were ones for which lenders did not 
adequately document income, employment, or assets. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 37, at 1835, 1847 & 
n.14. 
111. 
 
112. See supra notes 76–77, 84, and accompanying text. 
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2)(vii), (c)(7). 
114. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). 
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making that determination.115 These mandatory factors limit the ability of lenders 
to omit relevant factors from the algorithms that they use to evaluate repayment 
capacity. 
a. Lenders Must Take All Monthly Mortgage Expenses into Account. 
During the last bubble in 2008, some lenders qualified risky borrowers for 
mortgages based on principal and interest alone, without taking account of the 
added taxes and homeowner’s insurance.116 Dodd–Frank put a stop to that. Now, 
lenders must evaluate ability to repay not only based on the monthly principal 
and interest payments117 but also on “all applicable taxes, insurance (including 
mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.”118 
b. All Other Expected Mortgage Indebtedness on the Property Must Be Taken 
into Account. 
Under Dodd–Frank, when a creditor “knows, or has reason to know” that the 
home will secure other residential mortgage loans or home equity lines of credit 
(HELOCs) made to the same consumer, the creditor must make a reasonable 
determination of the consumer’s ability to repay all of those loans, plus all 
applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assess-
ments.119 The same verification and documentation requirements apply when  
115. The CFPB’s implementing regulation requires creditors to consider these eight underwriting 
factors when determining ability to repay:  
(i) Current or reasonably expected income or assets, other than the value of the dwelling that 
secures the loan; 
(ii) Current employment status, if the creditor relies on employment income to determine repay-
ment ability;  
(iiii) The monthly payment on the loan being applied for;  
(iv) The monthly payment on any simultaneous loan(s) that the creditor knows or has reason to 
know will be made;  
(v) The monthly payment for mortgage-related obligations;  
(vi) Current debt obligations, alimony, and child support;  
(vii) The monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual income; and  
(viii) Credit history. 
Id. § 1026.43(c)(2); see also id. § 1026.43(c)(3) cmt. (detailing ways in which creditors should obtain 
and assess underwriting factor information). 
116. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 37. 
117. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2)(iii). 
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1). The regulation encapsulates this requirement by requiring the 
ability-to-repay calculation to include the monthly payment for all “mortgage-related obligations,” 
including property taxes, premiums, and similar charges that are required by the creditor, any fees 
and special assessments imposed by a condominium, cooperative, or homeowner’s association, 
ground rent, and leasehold payments. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(8), (c)(2)(v). Mortgage-related 
obligations also include a variety of insurance or insurance-like premiums and charges required by 
the creditor, including: homeowners’ insurance; private mortgage insurance; credit life, accident, 
health, or loss-of-income insurance; and debt cancellation or debt suspension coverage. Id. 
§ 1026.4(b)(5), (7)–(8), (10). 
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(2). 
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evaluating the repayment capacity for these additional loans.120 
This treatment of multiple loans rules out the practice during the last housing 
bubble of pairing first-lien loans with so-called “piggyback seconds” (that is, a 
second lien layered on the first) without first ascertaining borrowers’ ability to 
service the added debt. The piggyback second phenomenon increased credit risk 
by circumventing down payment requirements and producing combined loan-to- 
value ratios of up to or in excess of 100%.121 
c. Additional Mandatory Factors. 
In addition to monthly payments for taxes, insurance, and other liens on the prop-
erty, creditors must consider a lengthy list of other factors concerning the loan appli-
cant’s ability and willingness to repay.122 These include credit history, current income, 
any expected income the applicant is reasonably assured of receiving, current obliga-
tions,123 the DTI ratio,124 
Id. Alternatively, the lender may consider the consumer’s remaining residual income after 
paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations. Most lenders use the monthly DTI ratio 
calculation instead of residual income. The monthly DTI calculation must divide the consumer’s total 
monthly debt obligations by his or her total monthly income (defined as the sum of the consumer’s 
current or reasonably expected income, including any income from assets). Total monthly debt 
obligations are the sum of the payment on the loan being applied for, payments on simultaneous loans on 
the same property, mortgage-related obligations, and current debt obligations, alimony, and child 
support. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(7)(i)(A). 
For transactions where the lender uses a residual income calculation instead, the lender must consider 
the consumer’s remaining income after subtracting the consumer’s total monthly debt obligations from 
the consumer’s total monthly income. Id. § 1026.43(c)(7)(ii)(B). 
For discussions of residual income, see, for example, Laurie S. Goodman et al., VA Loans Outperform 
FHA Loans—Why? And What Can We Learn?, 24 J. FIXED INCOME 39 (2015), Michael E. Stone et al., 
The Residual Income Approach to Housing Affordability: The Theory and the Practice (Austl. Hous. & 
Urban Research Inst., Working Paper No. 139, 2011), https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1002&context=communitystudies_faculty_pubs [https://perma.cc/PXX3-Q9LZ], and Pinto, 
supra note 18, at 35. 
employment status, and other financial resources apart from 
the person’s equity in the property securing repayment of the loan.125 This directive 
requires lenders’ underwriting algorithms to consider all of these factors. 
3. Lenders Must Take Potential Payment Shock into Account 
Dodd–Frank outlawed another technique used to artificially qualify borrowers 
with modest incomes. As discussed above, lenders during the bubble qualified 
numerous borrowers for adjustable-rate loans, interest-only loans, and option-pay 
loans based on the lower initial monthly payments alone instead of the higher  
120. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(12), (c)(2)(iv), (c)(6) (referring to these loans as “simultaneous 
loan[s]”). 
121. Piggyback seconds also allowed borrowers with low or no down payments to dispense with 
costly private mortgage insurance. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 35–36. 
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3). 
123. Id. Importantly, these current obligations include pre-existing and outstanding mortgage 
indebtedness, including other mortgage debt outstanding on the home that will secure the mortgage loan 
being applied for. See id. 
124. 
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3). 
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eventual payments that borrowers could face.126 This risk of future rising pay-
ments is referred to as “payment shock” and exists in all loans except for fully 
amortizing, fixed-rate loans. 
Lenders employed several variations on the practice of qualifying borrowers 
based solely on low initial payments before 2008, and in doing so, they effec-
tively circumvented the qualification process.127 For adjustable-rate loans offer-
ing low initial interest rates, lenders underwrote to this so-called “teaser rate” 
alone. Interest-only loans gave lenders an opportunity to base repayment determi-
nations solely on the small size of the interest-only payments without taking the 
substantial added cost of principal payments into account. Option-pay mortgages, 
the riskiest products of all, gave borrowers the option of making a fully amortiz-
ing payment, an interest-only payment, or an even lower payment (essentially a 
negative amortization option which would cause the principal to grow) every 
month. Some lenders evaluated repayment capacity based only on the negative 
amortization option, which produced the lowest monthly payment. Adding to the 
risk, lenders often made interest-only and option-pay mortgages with adjustable- 
rate features, which allowed them to further reduce the size of the monthly mort-
gage payment they relied on to qualify the borrower.128 
See Anya Martin, Interest-Only Loans Set the Bar High, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:07 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/interest-only-loans-set-the-bar-high-1420567670; McCoy, supra note 63, 
at 143–47. 
For a sense of the magnitude of the potential payment shock, between 2004 
and 2006, many subprime hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages had initial rate resets 
of 3% (300 basis points) after the introductory rate expired, resulting in increases 
in monthly payments that could exceed 50%.129 
See JAY BRINKMANN, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, AN EXAMINATION OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES, 
MODIFICATIONS, REPAYMENT PLANS AND OTHER LOSS MITIGATION ACTIVITIES IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 
2007, at 4 (2008), http://www.diamondlawmembers.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/59454_LoanModifica 
tionsSurvey%20mortgage%20bankers%20association.pdf [https://perma.cc/75VR-G25G]; America’s 
Housing Market: Cracks in the Fac¸ade, ECONOMIST (Mar. 22, 2007), https://www.economist.com/ 
briefing/2007/03/22/cracks-in-the-facade.
Two leading researchers reported 
that “a one-standard-deviation increase in the size of the payment shock [was] 
associated with . . . a 300% increase in the probability of defaulting” during that 
period.130 According to those researchers, that was the interest rate environment 
that borrowers faced from 2004 through 2006.131 Dodd–Frank banned most of 
these techniques, as we now explain. 
a. Qualifying Based on a Less-than-Fully Amortizing Loan Schedule. 
To begin with, Dodd–Frank outlawed the dangerous practice of qualifying bor-
rowers based on less-than-fully amortizing payments. As of 2014, Dodd–Frank 
required mortgage creditors to determine an applicant’s ability to repay “using a  
126. See supra Part II. 
127. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 35–37. 
128. 
129. 
 
130. Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 84, at 423. 
131. See id. 
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payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the term of the loan.”132 In 
the Act, Congress specified in painstaking detail how this was to be calculated for 
variable-rate loans, interest-only loans, and negative amortization loans.133 This 
means, in effect, that applicants must now qualify based on their ability to retire 
their mortgage loans, unlike before 2008, when many lenders qualified borrowers 
only based on initial monthly payments calculated on an interest-only or nega-
tively amortizing schedule. 
b. Underwriting to the Fully Indexed Rate or Other Higher Monthly Payment. 
The Dodd–Frank Act also prohibits the prior practice of underwriting to a low 
teaser rate alone for variable-rate (adjustable-rate) loans. Instead, lenders must 
now underwrite ARMs to “a fixed rate equal to the fully indexed rate at the time 
of the loan closing.”134 This provision is one more measure designed to prevent 
the added credit risk posed by payment shock to borrowers. 
132. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c 
(a)(3) (2012); see also id. § 1639c(a)(6)(D)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5)(i)(B) (2019). The regulation 
defines a “[f]ully amortizing payment” as “a periodic payment of principal and interest that will fully 
repay the loan amount over the loan term.” 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(2). Furthermore, the computation 
must use “[m]onthly, fully amortizing payments that are substantially equal.” Id. § 1026.43(c)(5)(i)(B). 
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5). These metrics apply to balloon loans, 
interest-only loans, option-pay loans, and negative amortization loans and embody the general rule that 
the mortgage payments must be calculated assuming substantially equal monthly payments over the life 
of the loan. Id. § 1026.43(c)(5)(ii); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 43. 
Balloon Loans: For balloon loans, lenders must calculate ability to repay based on the maximum 
scheduled payment during the first five years of the loan (or the maximum payment ever in the payment 
schedule, including any balloon payment, for “higher priced” home mortgages). 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c) 
(5)(ii)(A). A “higher priced” home mortgage is one in which the annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds 
the average prime offer rate (APOR) for a comparable transaction as of the date the interest rate is set by 
1.5 or more percentage points for first-lien loans or by 3.5 or more percentage points for subordinate-lien 
loans. Id. § 1026.43(b)(4). For rural or underserved small-creditor balloon payment QM loans, however, 
the rule defines the term “higher priced” loan as one where the APR exceeds the APOR by 3.5 
percentage points or more for first-lien loans. Id. § 1026.43(b)(4), (e)(5), (f). 
Interest-Only Loans: The determination must be based on “[s]ubstantially equal, monthly payments 
of principal and interest that will repay the loan amount over the term of the loan remaining as of the 
date the loan is recast.” Id. § 1026.43(c)(5)(ii)(B)(2). 
Negative Amortization Loans: The lender must base its calculation on “[s]ubstantially equal, monthly 
payments of principal and interest that will repay the maximum loan amount over the term of the loan 
remaining as of the date the loan is recast.” Id. § 1026.43(c)(5)(ii)(C)(2). 
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6)(D)(iii); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5)(i)(A), (c)(5)(ii)(B)–(C) 
(requiring that the creditor underwrite to the “fully indexed rate or any introductory interest rate, 
whichever is greater”). 
The Act defines the “fully indexed rate” as “the index rate prevailing on a residential mortgage loan at 
the time the loan is made plus the margin that will apply after the expiration of any introductory interest 
rates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(7). The regulation defines the “fully indexed rate” as “the interest rate 
calculated using the index or formula that will apply after recast, as determined at the time of 
consummation, and the maximum margin that can apply at any time during the loan term.” 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.43(b)(3). “Recast” means the date when: (1) an introductory fixed interest rate expires for an 
adjustable-rate mortgage; (2) interest-only payments are no longer permitted for an interest-only loan; 
and (3) negatively amortizing payments are no longer permitted for a negative amortization loan. Id. 
§ 1026.43(b)(11); see also id. § 1026.18(s)(7)(i), (s)(7)(iv)–(v) (providing the definitions of adjustable- 
rate mortgage, interest-only, and negative amortization). 
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To summarize, Dodd–Frank’s directive to conduct a reasonable determination 
of an applicant’s ability to repay is not just some vague injunction. To the con-
trary, the statute and the implementing regulations impose numerous objective 
restrictions on lenders’ discretion when making that determination. These include 
documenting and verifying income and assets; taking total monthly mortgage 
obligations plus a long list of other factors into account; and underwriting to 
the fully indexed rate (for ARMs) and a fully amortizing schedule. Together, 
these bright-line rules cabin lenders’ ability to relax loan underwriting in multiple 
and significant ways. 
B. THE QUALIFIED MORTGAGE PROVISION 
In the debate leading up to passage of the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress had to 
decide whether to ban the riskiest loan products outright. To preserve consumer 
choice, Congress decided against a ban. Instead, Dodd–Frank allows lenders to 
extend the riskiest types of nontraditional mortgages, but only if they internalize 
harm to borrowers from ability-to-repay violations.135 
The Qualified Mortgage provision gives lenders an option: they may offer ei-
ther higher-risk loans with full liability exposure to borrowers or traditional loans, 
subject to restrictions on product features, that give lenders a presumption of 
compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements. We open this discussion by 
defining a QM and describing the avenues for attaining QM status. Next, we turn 
to a discussion of the mechanics of the QM presumption of compliance. 
1. Qualified Mortgages Defined 
In Dodd–Frank, Congress created two categories of home mortgages: qualified 
mortgages and nonqualified mortgages. QM loans, like non-QM loans, must meet the 
ability-to-repay requirements just discussed.136 But unlike non-QM loans, QMs cannot 
have negative amortization, interest-only schedules, balloon payments, or terms 
exceeding thirty years.137 QMs also restrict prepayment penalties138 and typically cap 
total points and fees at 3%.139 These restrictions are intended to limit default rates. 
In a related vein, to qualify for General QM status, a lender must underwrite a loan to the highest 
interest rate allowed during the first five years of repayment. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv)(A); see also infra 
Section III.B.1 (discussing the requirements for QM status). 
135. Thus, it is incorrect to assert that the ATR/QM rule operates as a product ban. See Jason Scott 
Johnston, Do Product Bans Help Consumers?: Questioning the Economic Foundations of Dodd–Frank 
Mortgage Regulation, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 637 (2016) (arguing that the severity of the 
penalties acts as a de facto restriction, but acknowledging that these risky lending practices may still 
occur). 
136. See supra Section III.A. However, some types of QM loans allow alternative ways of satisfying 
those requirements, as this section discusses. 
137. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i)–(ii); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 45. The one 
firm exception is for rural or underserved small-creditor balloon payment QM loans. See infra notes 
155–64 and accompanying text. 
138. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(g). 
139. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv), (e)(3); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 45. For small loans, 
the regulation provides for higher fee caps of up to 8%, set according to a sliding scale based on the 
amount of the loan. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv), (e)(3). 
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Loans that are eligible for QM status offer two advantages. First, QMs give 
lenders a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay requirements.140 
Second, all loans satisfying the QM requirements are deemed to be Qualified 
Residential Mortgages (QRMs) and thus escape the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk reten-
tion requirements.141 
In contrast, non-QMs can have nontraditional terms and features, but they 
require risk retention and expose originators to liability for violations of the 
ability-to-repay requirements. Any mortgage loan that does not meet the QM 
requirements is automatically a non-QM. Importantly, single-family home mort-
gages guaranteed or insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Rural Housing Service (RHS) 
can also gain QM status under separate rules of their respective agencies.142 
Currently, there are five ways to qualify for QM status. The CFPB defined four 
of those paths in its regulations implementing the ATR/QM rule. In those regula-
tions, the CFPB first defined a general qualified mortgage and then offered three 
alternatives to the General QM definition: one for mortgages securitized by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, one for rural balloon portfolio loans by small cred-
itors, and one for mortgages held in portfolio by small creditors. Later, in 2018, 
Congress enacted legislation creating a fifth path to QM protection for portfolio 
loans by small banks, thrifts, and credit unions. 
a. General QM Loans. 
The General QM option is the starting point for any QM discussion. General 
QMs are limited to fully amortizing loans, with terms of up to thirty years and 
total points and fees not exceeding 3%.143 For a General QM, the creditor must 
make a reasonable determination of the applicant’s ability to repay the loan. As 
part of that analysis, the creditor must consider and verify at or before 
140. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1412, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) 
(2012). 
141. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 373.3–10 (risk retention rule). The risk retention provision requires sponsors 
of securitizations to hold a specified “economic interest in the credit risk of the securitized assets . . . .” 
Id. § 373.3(a). Specifically, securitizers must have “skin in the game” in the form of a 5% equity interest 
in the aggregate credit risk of the assets they securitize. See id. § 373.4(a). Securitizations backed solely 
by QRMs, however, are exempt from the risk retention requirement. Id. § 373.13(a)–(b). The 
Government Accountability Office concluded that the risk retention rule’s incentives to make QM loans 
“might set a floor to the loosening of credit.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-185, 
MORTGAGE REFORMS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP ASSESS EFFECTS OF NEW REGULATIONS 39 (2015) 
[hereinafter MORTGAGE REFORMS]. 
142. See 7 C.F.R. § 3555.109 (2018) (RHS final QM rule); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B)–(C), 
(e)(4)(ii)(E); 24 C.F.R. §§ 201.7, 203.19, 1005.120, 1007.80 (2018) (FHA final QM Rule); Loan Guaranty: 
Ability-to-Repay Standards and Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 50,506 (Oct. 9, 2018) (codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 36) (announcing Department of Veterans Affairs 
plans for a future QM rulemaking); Loan Guaranty: Ability-to-Repay Standards and Qualified Mortgage 
Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,620 (proposed May 9, 2014) (codified in parts 
at 38 C.F.R. pt. 36) (VA interim QM rule); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 46–47. 
143. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)–(3). Small mortgages may exceed the 3% cap. See supra note 139 
and accompanying text. 
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consummation the applicant’s current or reasonably expected income or assets 
(other than the value of the dwelling securing the home), current debt obliga-
tions, alimony, and child support obligations, in compliance with the CFPB’s 
Appendix Q, which specifies how to determine the terms “income” and 
“debt.”144 
12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(v); id. pt. 1026, app. Q; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, GENERAL 
COMPARISON OF ABILITY-TO-REPAY REQUIREMENTS WITH QUALIFIED MORTGAGES 1 (2016), https://files. 
consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb_atr-and-qm-comparison-chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/B493-BK7M] 
[hereinafter GENERAL COMPARISON]; CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 45–46. In addition, 
originators claiming General QM status must consider and verify employment status, simultaneous 
loans, and the DTI ratio when underwriting income and DTI. Originators making General QM loans 
routinely consider and verify credit histories and credit scores as well. See GENERAL COMPARISON, 
supra, at 2. 
There are currently debates about whether Appendix Q requires updating. See, e.g., Kate Berry, New 
Villain in Battle over CFPB Mortgage Rule: Appendix Q, AM. BANKER (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/new-villain-in-battle-over-cfpb-mortgage-rule-appendix-q.
In addition, creditors must underwrite ARMs to the maximum inter-
est rate applicable during the first five years of the loan.145 Finally, to claim 
General QM status, creditors must cap the ratio of the consumer’s total 
monthly debt to total monthly income at consummation at 43%.146 Fixed-rate 
QMs (except higher cost QMs) may charge prepayment penalties, but only dur-
ing the first three years after origination and only if the creditor also offers the 
applicant a loan without a penalty.147 Prepayment penalties are otherwise 
banned.148 
b. The “GSE Patch” QM. 
The most important QM alternative is the so-called “GSE patch.” This excep-
tion applies to loans eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (known 
as the Government-Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs), which receive QM status if 
they meet certain conditions.149 To gain QM status, a GSE loan must be fully 
amortizing, have a term of thirty years or less, and satisfy the points and fee cap 
for General QMs.150 The lender must also make a reasonable determination of the 
borrower’s ability to repay. Unlike General QMs, however, GSE QMs do not 
have to satisfy the 43% DTI cap or comply with the exact methods for  
144. 
 
145. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv)(A); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 45. For General 
QMs, creditors must also underwrite the loan using a payment schedule that will fully retire the loan 
balance by the end of the loan term. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv)(B); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 96, at 45. 
146. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). This ratio must be calculated in accordance with Appendix Q. 
See id. pt. 1026, app. Q. 
147. Id. § 1026.43(g)(2)–(3). Such penalties may not exceed 2% in the first two years or 1% in the 
third year of the loan and thereafter cannot be charged. Id. § 1026.43(g)(2)(ii)(A)–(B). This prepayment 
penalty provision applies to General QM loans as well as to alternative QM loans. Id. § 1026.43(g)(1)(ii) 
(B). 
148. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1412, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c 
(c)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(g)(2). 
149. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(A). Jumbo loans do not qualify for the GSE patch because they do 
not meet the GSEs’ loan limit requirements. PLATT ET AL., supra note 104, at 2. 
150. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(i)(A). 
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determining monthly debt and income set forth in the CFPB’s Appendix Q.151 
See id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(i); id. pt. 1026, app. Q. According to the CFPB, “Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac provide a high degree of specific detail for the method to be used to calculate income and 
debt.” CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 193. 
In addition, GSE ARMs need not be underwritten to the maximum rate in the first five years of the 
loan in order to receive QM status under the GSE patch. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(i)(A); GENERAL 
COMPARISON, supra note 144, at 1. However, the GSEs impose their own rules for considering the 
payment shock on ARMs when determining ability to repay. FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE 
MAE SINGLE FAMILY 216 (2018), https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel120418.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/K6EZ-4VXW]. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have their own, higher DTI limits of 50% for GSE loans that undergo 
automated underwriting. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AN OVERVIEW OF 
ENTERPRISE DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIOS 11 (2019) [hereinafter IG Report], https://www.fhfaoig.gov/sites/ 
default/files/WPR-2019-002.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YYL-UQKQ]; Damian Paletta, Federal Government 
Has Dramatically Expanded Exposure to Risky Mortgages, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019, 2:34 PM), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-government-has-dramatically-expanded-exposure- 
to-risky-mortgages/2019/10/02/d862ab40-ce79-11e9-87fa-8501a456c003_story.html.
As 
a result, for GSE-patch loans, originators may (and do) use the GSEs’ require-
ments in lieu of those in Appendix Q for considering, documenting, and verifying 
mortgage-related obligations, income, assets, employment status, simultaneous 
loans, and debt.152 
Today, about a third of new originations are GSE loans,153 
In first quarter 2019, GSE-securitized mortgage originations accounted for 37.3% of all residential 
mortgage originations in the United States. HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE: A 
MONTHLY CHARTBOOK 8 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100723/july_ 
chartbook_2019_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJG6-2DCL] [hereinafter HOUSING CHARTBOOK]. In contrast, 
Federal Housing Administration loans and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) loans together accounted 
for 20.2% of originations that quarter. Id. 
so a substantial 
number of QM loans take advantage of the GSE patch. However, the future of the 
GSE patch is up for debate because the patch is temporary and due to sunset 
on January 10, 2021 or to expire whenever the GSEs leave conservatorship— 
whichever comes first.154 
c. The Rural/Underserved Small Creditor Balloon Payment QM. 
The second QM alternative is relatively narrow and only applies to fixed-rate 
balloon loans, including higher priced loans, originated by rural creditors for 
terms of five years or more.155 Rural creditors are small creditors156 who make at 
least one first-lien home mortgage in a rural or underserved area annually.157 
151. 
 
152. GENERAL COMPARISON, supra note 144, at 1. 
153. 
154. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B). In contrast, the QM exceptions for FHA, VA, and RHS 
loans are permanent. See id. 
155. Id. §§ 1026.43(f)(1)(i), (iv). 
156. Small creditors are mortgage lenders who originate up to 2000 covered first-lien mortgages 
annually (excluding portfolio loans) and who, together with their mortgage-lending affiliates, have total 
year-end assets of less than $2 billion (adjusted for inflation). Id. §§ 1026.35(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(C); id. 
§ 1026.43(f)(2)(ii) cmt. 1; id. § 1026.43(e)(5) cmt. 4. 
157. Id. §§ 1026.35(b)(2)(iii)(A), (b)(2)(iv)(A)(2), 1026.43(f)(1)(vi); Amendments to the 2013 
Mortgage Rules Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X), and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 60,382, 
60,415 (Oct. 1, 2013) (codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). 
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Rural creditors must hold eligible balloon loans in portfolio for at least three 
years, with limited exceptions, to receive QM protection.158 These loans are an 
exception to the general rule that balloon loans cannot receive QM status.159 The 
justification for this alternative was that small lenders had lower default rates dur-
ing the crisis and have greater incentives to exercise care when originating mort-
gages held in portfolio.160 
Under the rural balloon QM alternative, the principal balance may not increase 
over the life of the loan.161 The originator must also satisfy the General QM cap on 
points and fees.162 It must consider and verify the borrower’s ability to pay the 
scheduled monthly payments, but need not follow the exact documentation 
requirements in Appendix Q.163 Unlike General QM loans, there is no DTI cap. 
But lenders seeking to make a rural fixed-rate balloon QM loan must still consider 
an applicant’s DTI ratio or residual income when determining ability to repay and 
must verify the debt obligations and income used when determining that ratio.164 
d. Small-Creditor Portfolio QM. 
A third alternative, the small-creditor portfolio QM, provides QM status to cer-
tain mortgage loans originated by small creditors and held in portfolio. The rule 
adopts the same definition of the term “small creditors” as the rural, underserved 
small-creditor balloon payment QM.165 To obtain QM protection, small creditors 
must hold the mortgage loans in portfolio for at least three years, with limited 
exceptions.166 And like General QM loans, small-creditor portfolio QMs must be 
fully amortizing, have terms not exceeding thirty years, and have total points and 
fees normally not exceeding 3%.167 In addition, the lender must underwrite the 
applicant’s ability to repay based on the maximum interest rate in the first five 
years of the loan.168 
158. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(f)(1)(v), (f)(2). 
159. CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 47. Originally, the CFPB adopted a temporary, 
small-creditor balloon payment QM alternative for small creditors that did not operate predominantly in 
rural or underserved areas. This alternative expired on April 1, 2016, after the Bureau liberalized the 
threshold for operating in a rural or underserved area. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(6); Operations in 
Rural Areas Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z); Interim Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,074, 
16,075 (Mar. 25, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
160. PLATT ET AL., supra note 104, at 3. 
161. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(f)(1)(i), (f)(1)(iv)(B). Essentially, this precludes interest-only or negative 
amortization terms during the period of the scheduled payments. The rule contains other requirements 
designed to keep the monthly scheduled payments flat and ensure some amortization of principal. See id. 
162. Id. § 1026.43(e)(3)(i)(A); see supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
163. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(f)(1)(i)–(ii). The lender does not have to determine the applicant’s ability 
to repay the balloon payment. Id. 
164. Id. § 1026.43(f)(1)(iii). 
165. Id. §§ 1026.35(b)(2)(iii)(B)–(C), 1026.43(e)(5)(i)(D); see supra note 156 and accompanying 
text. Covered first-lien loans held in portfolio are excluded in calculating the annual loan origination 
limit. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(b)(2)(iii)(B). 
166. Id. § 1026.43(e)(5)(i)(C), (e)(5)(ii). 
167. Id. § 1026.43(e)(5)(i); see supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
168. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(5)(i)(B). 
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The CFPB relaxed certain requirements for small creditor portfolio QM loans, 
as compared to General QM loans. Lenders making small creditor portfolio QMs 
have no DTI cap.169 Although they must document and verify income and assets 
as part of making a reasonable determination of the applicant’s ability to repay, 
they are exempt from the CFPB’s exact documentation and verification standards 
in Appendix Q.170 
e. Small Bank Portfolio QM. 
In the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act in 
2018,171 Congress enacted a last QM alternative, this one for portfolio loans by 
small banks, thrifts, and credit unions.172 The small bank portfolio QM applies to 
insured depository institutions and credit unions that, together with their affiliates, 
have less than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. To qualify for this alterna-
tive, an eligible institution must originate and hold the mortgage in portfolio 
indefinitely, with limited opportunities for resale.173 This alternative is broader 
than the CFPB’s small creditor portfolio QM in that it applies to institutions with 
somewhat larger asset sizes but narrower in that it excludes nonbank mortgage 
lenders and places greater restrictions on resale. 
Under this alternative, negative amortization and interest-only features are 
prohibited174 and total points and fees are normally capped at 3%. Similarly, 
prepayment penalties are prohibited, except on fixed-rate loans that are not 
higher cost, in which case those penalties are subject to a three-year phase- 
out.175 
Like the other QM alternatives, the new small-bank portfolio QM dispenses 
with some General QM requirements. Most importantly, small-bank portfolio 
QMs are free from any DTI cap.176 In addition, to document an applicant’s debt, 
income, and financial resources, lenders may use methods other than those speci-
fied in Appendix Q when determining ability to repay. 
To summarize, although the General QM and the four QM alternatives have 
their differences, they all require the same core safety features. They all prohibit 
169. That does not mean that the lender can ignore the DTI ratio. In order to claim a small-creditor 
portfolio QM exception for a loan, a lender must consider at or before consummation the applicant’s 
monthly DTI ratio or residual income and verify the debt obligations and income it uses to determine 
that ratio. Id. § 1026.43(e)(5)(i)(B). 
170. Id. § 1026.43(e)(5)(i)(A). 
171. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 
Stat. 1296 (2018). 
172. See id. § 101, 132 Stat. at 1297–98 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(F)). 
173. Id. § 101, 132 Stat. at 1298. To retain safe harbor status, an eligible portfolio loan may only be 
transferred: (1) to someone else by reason of the institution’s bankruptcy or failure; (2) to another small 
depository institution or credit union that holds it in portfolio; (3) through a merger, so long as the 
acquirer holds it in portfolio; or (4) to a wholly-owned subsidiary of the small institution, so long as the 
loan is treated as an asset of the small institution for regulatory accounting purposes. Id. 
174. Id. The legislation leaves it unclear whether balloon loans are allowed under this alternative. 
175. Id. 
176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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negative amortization and interest-only terms,177 restrict prepayment penalties, 
and limit loan terms to thirty years. In addition, all QMs must satisfy the points 
and fee cap. As part of a reasonable determination of an applicant’s ability to 
repay, all QMs must further document and verify income and assets and take pay-
ment shock into account, although the precise methods for doing so vary depend-
ing on the type of QM. That leaves one outstanding difference among the five 
types of QMs—the 43% DTI cap—which the General QM imposes but the alter-
native QMs do not. The bottom line is that, however QM status is achieved, 
QM loans all enjoy a presumption of compliance with the ability-to-repay 
requirements. 
2. Liability Exposure for QM and Non-QM Loans 
Residential mortgages have posed new liability concerns ever since Congress 
gave borrowers recourse against originators and assignees for violations of the 
federal ability-to-repay requirements in 2010. Under the Dodd–Frank Act, 
aggrieved borrowers may initiate actions for such violations within three years of 
the violation.178 In addition, borrowers who undergo foreclosure or are sued for 
collection of residential mortgage loans may raise ability-to-repay violations as 
a matter of defense by way of recoupment or set off with no time limit.179 To estab-
lish liability, borrowers may either prove a failure to observe the general ability- 
to-repay standard (that is, that the lender failed to make a reasonable determination 
of the borrower’s ability to repay) or a per se violation of one of the rule’s bright- 
line requirements (such as income verification and documentation).180 
From the lenders’ viewpoint, the main attraction of QM loans is the protection 
they provide from legal exposure to ability-to-repay violations. Of course, a mort-
gage must actually have QM status in order for the presumption to apply. Unless 
all of the QM requirements are met, defendants cannot raise the presumption. 
Accordingly, borrowers who wish to litigate ability-to-repay violations may pro-
ceed if their loans did not qualify for QM status.181 
177. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The General QM, the GSE Patch, the small-creditor 
portfolio QM, and possibly the small-bank portfolio QM also prohibit balloon payment terms. See id. 
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (2012). Under the provisions of the Truth in Lending Act governing ability- 
to-repay violations, creditors and assignees face potential monetary liability for actual damages, 
statutory damages of $4,000 per loan (subject to a cap for class actions), special statutory damages 
equaling all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer for up to three years, refunds of certain 
finance charges, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. § 1640(a); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 
36–37. Special statutory damages cannot be awarded if the creditor proves that the failure to comply was 
immaterial. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(4). 
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(k)(1). 
180. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MORTGAGE LENDING § 6.2.3.3.4.2 (3d ed. 2019) (noting that 
“in order to rebut the presumption . . . , a borrower would need to show that the creditor’s determination 
of ability to repay was not made in good faith based on information in the lender’s possession”); id. 
§ 6.2.3.3.2 (listing bright-line requirements that lenders must meet to satisfy the minimum ability-to- 
repay standards). 
181. PLATT ET AL., supra note 104, at 4; NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 180, § 6.2.3.3.4.1 
(“Unless all the qualified mortgage standards are met, the presumption does not arise.”). 
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Assuming that a loan does have QM status, the nature of the presumption 
depends on the loan price. QM loans that are not higher priced offer a conclusive 
presumption (that is, a safe harbor) against liability for ability-to-repay viola-
tions.182 Higher priced QM loans,183 in contrast, only offer a rebuttable presump- 
tion.184 Borrowers with higher priced QM loans can rebut the presumption by 
showing that the originator failed to make a reasonable, good-faith determination 
that the borrower would have had sufficient residual income or assets to meet liv-
ing expenses after taking into account the household’s monthly obligations.185 
In sum, Congress’s decision to enact the ATR/QM provisions took a landmark 
step toward sound underwriting of home mortgages throughout the business 
cycle. Today, virtually all residential mortgage lenders must make a reasonable 
and good faith determination of borrowers’ ability to repay before extending 
credit. Of crucial importance, the ability-to-repay requirement is not some vague 
command: to the contrary, it requires lenders to meet a series of demanding 
objective requirements when determining repayment capacity. These bright-line 
requirements significantly limit lenders’ ability to loosen underwriting standards. 
The qualified mortgage provisions build on the baseline repayment determina-
tion while allowing lenders to offer a wide variety of loan products depending on 
their appetite for liability exposure for ability-to-repay violations. Lenders who 
want the assurance of a safe harbor from legal exposure will offer safer loan prod-
ucts in the form of prime-rate QMs, and lenders willing to settle for a rebuttable 
presumption of compliance with the ATR requirements can expand into higher 
priced QM loans. Loan products with higher default propensities—most notably 
negative amortization, interest-only, and balloon payment loans—remain an 
option, but require lenders and assignees to internalize the cost of any ability-to- 
repay violations. 
IV. THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE IS KEY TO FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Commentators usually treat the ATR/QM rule as a consumer-protection provi-
sion.186 But the rule has larger significance as a bulwark against systemic risk, 
particularly against the types of credit-induced property bubbles that have histori-
cally been catastrophic.187 Observers disagree about whether a bubble can be dis-
tinguished from an increase in market fundamentals.188 However, regulators can 
182. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i) (2019); CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 44. 
183. Normally, higher priced QM loans have an APR that exceeds the APOR for a comparable loan 
by 1.5 or more percentage points for a first-lien loan or by 3.5 or more percentage points for a 
subordinate-lien loan. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(4). However, for the small-creditor portfolio QM and 
rural or underserved small-creditor balloon payment QM alternatives, a higher-priced loan is defined as 
one whose APR exceeds the APOR for a comparable loan by 3.5 percentage points or more. See id. 
184. See id. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii). 
185. Id. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B). For a discussion of residual income tests, see supra note 124. 
186. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 135. 
187. See Greenwald, supra note 65, at 4. 
188. See Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 
1193–95 (2015). 
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detect an uptick in the high-risk loan practices that typically fuel bubbles and 
curb those practices as a preventative measure. The ATR/QM rule is one of a 
suite of sectoral tools that serve this function. 
This and similar ability-to-repay rules189 have proven to be effective. A grow-
ing body of research finds that such rules are associated with reductions in mort-
gage default risk. Studies of earlier state ability-to-repay rules further conclude 
that lenders did comply with those rules during the last housing bubble.190 
Because those laws only covered limited types of lenders, they were not enough 
to counteract the nationwide decline in lending standards triggered by other lend-
ers who escaped the state ATR laws. Nevertheless, pre-2008 experience with the 
earlier state ATR rules fundamentally calls into question the assumption that my-
opia will cause lenders to disregard ability-to-repay requirements during bubbles. 
A. THE USE OF SECTORAL TOOLS TO CONSTRAIN SYSTEMIC RISK 
Systemic risk regulation pays close attention to credit-fueled housing bubbles 
due to mortgage credit’s leading role in financial crises. As is well documented, 
mortgage credit supports and amplifies housing bubble formation.191 Hence, it is 
feasible to restrain the lax credit that fuels break-away home price appreciation 
resulting in bubbles. The ability-to-repay rule is designed to do just that. 
Thanks to voluminous research, we can now identify dangerous lending prac-
tices. Researchers have identified the key lending practices and terms associated 
with elevated mortgage defaults in the United States192 Based on that research, 
policymakers can pinpoint those practices and terms for potential intervention. 
Regardless of whether forecasters can predict housing bubbles themselves, it is 
eminently possible to restrict the hazardous underlying credit practices that have 
historically propelled those bubbles.193 
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke highlighted this strategy when, in a 2013 press 
conference, he called for a “tripartite” approach of better monitoring, supervision and regulation, and 
increased communications with markets to curb incipient bubbles. See Catherine Hollander, What You 
Need to Know About Ben Bernanke’s Evolving Views on Asset Bubbles, NAT’L J. (Mar. 20, 2013, 1:45 
PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/s/82386/what-you-need-know-about-ben-bernankes-evolving- 
views-asset-bubbles.
Regulating those terms and practices is 
key to breaking the vicious cycle of loose mortgage credit culminating in finan-
cial crises. 
To this end, a growing literature on sectoral tools discusses and evaluates the 
use of mortgage regulation to curb systemic risk.194 Sectoral tools seek to curb 
the growth of excessive risk in systemically important sectors, such as housing. 
Traditionally, countries that have taken a sectoral approach have used leverage 
189. In the decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis, a number of states had adopted their own state 
ability-to-repay rules. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
190. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
191. See, e.g., Andrey Pavlov & Susan Wachter, Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets, 38 
J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 89 (2009) (outlining the Pavlov–Wachter indicator of bubbles, which is 
based on leverage conditions). 
192. See supra notes 76–77, 83–86. 
193. 
 
194. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 188, at 1208–13. 
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(loan-to-value) limits, debt-to-income caps, provisioning rules, and capital- 
adequacy-risk weights to prevent housing market booms and busts.195 
See id. For an inventory of these tools in the United States, see OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2013 
ANNUAL REPORT 35–38 & fig.27 (2013), http://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/files/office-of- 
financial-research-annual-report-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SBT-XQRG]. In 2016, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board issued the new current expected credit losses (CECL) provisioning 
standard. The CECL standard is designed to increase loan loss reserves by basing them on expected 
losses, even if those losses are not probable. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE NEW ACCOUNTING STANDARD ON FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS— 
CREDIT LOSSES 1, 5 (2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2019/bulletin-2019- 
17a.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFC5-ULGH].
Meanwhile, under the Basel regime, global risk-weighted capital standards include risk weights for 
residential mortgages. See McCoy, supra note 188, at 1199–1205. In addition, Canada, China, 
Colombia, the Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and a number of Eastern 
European nations cap loan-to-value ratios, whereas Korea and Hong Kong limit debt-to-income ratios. 
See id. at 1210 & n.139, 1212. 
Each of 
these techniques targets individual drivers of mortgage defaults with an eye to-
ward reducing default risk. 
In the United States, regulators use capital adequacy risk weights and DTI lim-
its (as part of the General QM test), among other measures, to curb aggregate 
default risk from residential mortgages. But unlike other countries, the United 
States has rejected adopting across-the-board leverage limits196 
The GSEs and FHA do cap LTVs, but exercise discretion about where to set those caps—the 
current limits are generous. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac impose liberal LTV caps on the loans they 
securitize. Currently, the GSEs buy home mortgages with LTVs of up to 97%. 97% LTV Options, 
FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/97-ltv-options [https://perma.cc/9WCK-28WR] 
(last visited December 22, 2019); Home Possible, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
homepossible/ [https://perma.cc/R23Z-8NKD] (last visited December 22, 2019). FHA limits LTVs on 
the loans it insures from 90% to 96.5%, depending on the borrower’s credit score. See U.S. DEP’T HOUS. 
& URBAN DEV., HUD HOME STORE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS): CONSUMERS AND THE 
GENERAL PUBLIC 2 (2015), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PUBLICFAQ.PDF [https://perma.cc/ 
DFG5-AY6L]; U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUMMARY OF FY 2015 FHA ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON THE FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 9 (2015), https:// 
archives.hud.gov/news/2015/pr15-146-FHAAnnRptDeck111315.pdf [https://perma.cc/8723-N2L4].
due to concerns 
about access to credit. The question whether to impose LTV caps on home mort-
gages was broached during the Obama Administration. In 2013, the CFPB 
decided against incorporating a leverage limit into the ATR/QM rule on grounds 
that down payments do not reflect repayment capacity.197 Meanwhile, fellow fed-
eral financial regulators proposed incorporating a stiff LTV cap indirectly by 
requiring securitizations backed by residential loans with loan-to-value ratios 
exceeding 70% to hold risk retention of 5%.198 
The risk retention proposal set off a firestorm of controversy due to its feared 
effect on mortgage availability.199 
See, e.g., Kevin Wack, Frank Toughens Criticism of Risk-Retention Opponents, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 20, 2011, 11:48 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/frank-toughens-criticism-of-risk- 
retention-opponents.
That proposal would have had strong negative 
195. 
 
196. 
 
197. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6458 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
198. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,928, 57,994 (Sept. 20, 2013) (codified at 
scattered parts of 12 C.F.R., 17 C.F.R., and 24 C.F.R.). 
199. 
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distributional consequences because lower income and minority borrowers can 
rarely raise a down payment of 20%, let alone 30%.200 
See DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ABILITY TO REPAY, RISK-RETENTION 
STANDARDS, AND MORTGAGE CREDIT ACCESS 14 (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YK8F-VXHR]; ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNC CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, 
BALANCING RISK AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS AND QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 
10–11 (2012) [hereinafter BALANCING RISK], http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/ 
research-analysis/Underwriting-Standards-for-Qualified-Residential-Mortgages.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E63Z-H86E]; Revitalizing the Private Mortgage Market: ‘Skin in the Game’ and the Consequences for 
Future Homebuyers, WHARTON: KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 11, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton. 
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2775 [https://perma.cc/M4JB-JZB2].
A 2012 study concluded, 
for instance, that 75% of African-American borrowers and 70% of Latino bor-
rowers with performing loans could not have afforded a 20% down payment 
requirement when they first obtained their mortgages.201 Due to these concerns, 
the final risk retention rule scrapped the 70% leverage limit test and replaced it 
with a risk retention exemption for securitizations backed solely by qualified 
mortgages.202 
As a result of these events, the United States turned to other sectoral tools to 
constrain the default risk from residential mortgages that would have less of an 
effect on credit access. Key among those tools was the ability-to-repay rule. 
Like leverage limits, the ATR/QM rule seeks to constrain the default risk from 
residential mortgages, but it does so in different ways. Leverage limits restrict 
high combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTVs) to ensure that homeowners have 
enough equity in their homes to protect them from declining property values. In 
contrast, the ATR/QM rule addresses other determinants of defaults,203 particu-
larly reduced documentation underwriting, less-than-fully amortizing terms, pre-
payment penalties, payment shock from adjustable-rate features, high DTI ratios, 
and loans combining two or more of these risks. Since the early 2000s, a growing 
body of research has examined whether these and similar restrictions produce 
better borrower repayment and lower default rates. 
B. THE EFFECT OF THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE ON REPAYMENT 
Until recently, debates about the effectiveness of the ATR/QM rule primarily 
remained in the realm of the hypothetical due to the rule’s relative newness and 
the resulting lack of data. In 2019, however, the CFPB produced an empirical 
assessment of the rule’s effectiveness.204 This assessment report and related stud-
ies allow us to evaluate whether the ATR/QM rule is having its intended effect. 
200. 
 
201. BALANCING RISK, supra note 200, at 10–11, 27–28 & fig.8. 
202. See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,681–82, 77,684, 77,688, 77,696 (Dec. 24, 
2014) (codified in scattered parts at 12 C.F.R., 17 C.F.R., and 24 C.F.R.). Mortgages that qualify for this 
exemption are known as “qualified residential mortgages,” or QRMs. 
203. See supra notes 76, 83–86, and accompanying text. 
204. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96. Section 1022(d) of the Dodd–Frank Act requires 
the Bureau to conduct an empirical assessment of every significant new regulation and publish a report 
on that assessment within five years of the effective date of the rule. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act § 1022(d), 12 U.S.C. § 5512(d) (2012). The purpose of this assessment is 
to gauge the rule’s effectiveness: “The assessment shall address, among other relevant factors, the 
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1. Studies Projecting the Effect the Rule Would Have Had on Defaults During 
the Last Financial Crisis 
Starting in 2010, serious delinquencies on residential mortgages declined 
sharply and dropped by more than half after the ATR/QM rule took effect in 
2014.205 However, the ATR/QM rule is not likely the cause of that drop. Other 
factors, including private credit standards that were already tight when the rule 
took effect, improved economic conditions, quantitative easing actions taken by 
the Federal Reserve System to ease mortgage rates and underwrite availability of 
agency lending, the GSEs’ conservatorship, and recovery in the housing market 
undoubtedly contributed to the decline. Furthermore, the low delinquency rates 
for recent vintages do not predict whether the rule will produce lower default 
rates under distressed conditions. 
To answer that last question, several studies have identified mortgage loans ori-
ginated before 2008 that would have met key ability-to-repay and QM provisions 
if those laws had been in effect and studied the performance of those loans. The 
CFPB assessment, for instance, examined loans with “restricted features” (that is, 
features that the ATR/QM rule regulates today) that were originated at the height 
of the housing bubble and later went into early foreclosure.206 The assessment 
defined “restricted features” to include interest-only clauses, negative amortiza-
tion clauses, balloon payments, terms over thirty years, low- or no-documentation 
underwriting, or an ARM reset in less than five years.207 According to the report, 
fully 50–60% of early foreclosures for loans originated in 2005 through 2007 
involved mortgage loans with restricted features.208 
CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 86, 87 fig.21; see also MORTGAGE REFORMS, supra 
note 141, at 27–28, 28 n.48 (discussing a Goldman Sachs study that found that the 29% of loans 
originated between 2005 and 2008 that did not appear to satisfy the QM standards accounted for 47% of 
the defaults during the period). 
These three vintages occurred at the top of the housing bubble and produced the highest average 
default rates of the years preceding the 2008 crisis. CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 86 fig.20; 
see also Chris Foote et al., Income Growth, Credit Growth, and Lending Standards: Revisiting the 
Evidence, FED. RES. BANK ATL. (Apr. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/LQT7-6GBM] (noting that “loans 
made in 2005 did not perform well during the housing crisis, but the performance of loans made in 2006 
and 2007 was even worse”). 
Based on the high default 
propensity of these loans originated from 2005 through 2007, the Bureau con-
cluded that the ATR/QM rule “would likely have prevented at least some of the 
early foreclosed loans that had these features from being originated in the first 
effectiveness of the rule . . . in meeting the purposes and objectives of [Title X of Dodd–Frank] and the 
specific goals stated by the Bureau.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
205. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 9–10; HOUSING CHARTBOOK, supra note 153, at 
24. 
206. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 84. The report defined the early foreclosure rate 
as a measurement of whether a borrower was ever in foreclosure in the first two years following 
origination. See id. at 84. The Bureau used the early foreclosure rate as a proxy for inability to repay, 
reasoning that loans with restricted features are more likely to be unaffordable at their inception and thus 
to go into early foreclosure. See id. at 83–84. By only examining early foreclosures, the study was able 
to mostly rule out other possible causes for default such as a subsequent job loss or divorce. 
207. See id. at 85, 86 fig.20. 
208. 
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place, potentially eliminating a majority of early foreclosed loans” from the 2005 
through 2007 vintages.209 
A similar study by Professors Floros and White in 2016 examined the seri-
ous delinquency rate210 for non-agency securitized mortgages originated 
between 1997 and 2009. They found that key provisions of the ATR/QM rule 
would have had a significant marginal effect in reducing that delinquency 
rate. These provisions included, in decreasing size of effect, the QM prohibi-
tions on negative amortization clauses; the full documentation requirements; 
and the QM restrictions on prepayment penalties, interest-only terms, and 
balloon payment clauses.211 According to the authors, had the ATR/QM rule 
been in effect for the 1997 through 2009 vintages, those provisions would 
have reduced the serious delinquency rate for non-agency securitized mort-
gages by 22.7%.212 
In another study, Professors Quercia, Ding, and Reid examined the perform-
ance of mortgage loans originated between 2000 and 2008.213 Extrapolating from 
their results, full-documentation loans originated during the study period that 
would have met today’s QM requirements had a 24.6% lower cumulative default 
rate through February 2011 than the same rate for the control group.214 This esti-
mate is strikingly similar to that made by Floros and White. 
Together, these studies provide support for the conclusion that had the 
ATR/QM rule been in effect preceding the last financial crisis, it would have 
produced a substantial reduction in default risk. Moreover, these studies 
likely understate the beneficial effects of the ATR/QM rule because their 
results do not account for the added increment of loan defaults that occurred 
due to excessive LTV ratios after the bubble burst and property values fell. 
These defaults—which involved loans that had financed home purchases at 
significantly higher prices than what the homes were later worth post-crisis— 
resulted from the easing of credit constraints through what would now be 
ATR violations or the ensuing recession that resulted from the bursting of the 
bubble. Hence, the significance of the ATR/QM rule for financial stability 
extends beyond the individual propensity to default on such loans (relative to 
others) originated in the crisis years, to curbing the loose credit that inflates 
209. CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 86. Later, after the financial crisis, the percentage of 
restricted feature loans plummeted and further declined after the ATR/QM rule took effect in 2014. Id. 
at 85–86, 86 fig.20, 88, 89 fig.22, 93–94, 94 fig.25. 
210. “Serious delinquency” is defined as a loan that was ever at least ninety days delinquent, 
foreclosed on, or real estate owned. See Floros & White, supra note 83, at 91. In the empirical literature, 
this is a common operational definition of default. 
211. See id. at 95, 96 tbl.5. 
212. See id. at 87–88 (presenting this calculation by the authors). The authors did not analyze loans 
securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored entities or GSEs), which had a 
significantly lower serious delinquency rate than the non-agency securitized loans in questions. Id. at 87, 
91, 103 tbl.C-1, 104 app. C (reporting that over 44% of the non-agency loans studied became seriously 
delinquent, compared to 5.3% of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitized loans). 
213. See BALANCING RISK, supra note 200. 
214. See id. at 15–16, 16 tbl.1 (presenting this calculation by the authors). 
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housing bubbles in the first place.215 This is of systemic importance 
because, as the CFPB observed in the assessment, the ATR/QM rule “lim-
its” the reemergence of restricted-feature loans associated with elevated 
foreclosures “and any consequent consumer harm or macroeconomic 
disruption.”216 
2. Effect of Earlier State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on Default Risk 
Another way to predict the effect of the ATR/QM rule on default risk under 
distressed conditions is to measure the effect of state anti-predatory lending laws 
(APLs) that were in effect in some states during the housing bubble. Although 
Congress did not adopt the Dodd–Frank ATR/QM rule until 2010, a number of 
states adopted state APLs during the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. 
Many of these state laws contained early versions of the ability-to-repay require-
ment plus other restrictions on lax lending.217 
Professor White and his coauthors reported that states with strong APLs con-
taining ability-to-repay requirements produced compliance.218 These states had 
large reductions in option-pay ARM loans and loans with prepayment penalties, 
both associated with higher default rates.219 As a result, mortgages originated by 
lenders who were subject to strict state APLs between 2002 and 2006 were 25% 
less likely to default than loans made by originators who were exempt from those 
state laws.220 Professor Keys and his coauthors found that low-documentation 
loans made in Georgia and New Jersey between 2001 and 2006 had lower delin-
quency rates when both states were enforcing their strictest state anti-predatory 
lending law provisions.221 Professor Quercia and his coauthors found reductions 
in loans with three features regulated by the North Carolina APL—prepayment 
penalties, balloon payments, and high LTVs—thus evidencing compliance by 
regulated lenders.222 Researchers Li and Ernst similarly found that state APLs 
resulted in a reduction in loans with regulated terms, providing evidence of 
215. See Arthur Acolin, Xudong An & Susan M. Wachter, Lending Competition, Regulation and 
Non-Traditional Mortgages 4–5, 22–23 (Jan. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
216. CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 87. 
217. See Alan White et al., The Impact of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure 
Crisis, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 253 (2011). 
218. See id. at 265. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. at 267, 282 tbl.9; see also id. at 269 (“[M]ore general APLs without specific restrictions 
on repayment ability requirements were not strong enough to counteract the deterioration of 
underwriting standards that occurred during the latter half of the subprime boom, particularly in high- 
cost states such as California.”); Lei Ding et al., The Impact of Federal Preemption of State 
Antipredatory Lending Laws on the Foreclosure Crisis, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 367, 379–383, 
380 tbl.3, 381 tbl.4, 382 tbl.5 (2012) (finding that the relative loan performance of lenders who were not 
subject to APLs due to federal preemption deteriorated more than that of lenders who were subject to 
those laws). Pre-crisis, federally chartered banks and thrifts were exempt from the state APLs by virtue 
of federal preemption. See infra note 235. 
221. See Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?, supra note 32, at 312, 341–44. 
222. See Roberto G. Quercia et al., Assessing the Impact of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending 
Law, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 573, 577–79, 586–88, 593–97 (2004). 
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compliance.223 Meanwhile, Professor Rose reported that mortgages originated in 
states with APLs restricting prepayment penalties between 2002 and 2006 were 
associated with lower average probabilities of default.224 In addition, Acolin and 
his coauthors found that default rates were lower in states where and when such 
laws were in place.225 
Two conclusions flow from these studies. First, states with ability-to-repay 
requirements as part of their strong state APLs experienced lower default rates, 
according to a number of measures, than states without those laws. Second, dur-
ing the last housing bubble, lenders who were subject to state APLs usually com-
plied with those laws. Accordingly, the experience with state APLs before 2008 
provides additional evidence of the beneficial potential of the ATR/QM rule. 
3. Effect on the Underwriting Quality of Restricted-Feature Loans 
Finally, a last line of inquiry examines the underwriting quality of recent re-
stricted-feature loans. Interestingly, and in keeping with Congress’s intent, the 
ATR/QM rule did not eliminate restricted-feature loans altogether. Instead, 
according to the CFPB assessment, limited numbers of interest-only loans, lim-
ited-documentation loans, and loans with ARM resets of under five years contin-
ued to be made after the ability-to-repay rule took effect.226 
According to the assessment report, the ability-to-repay rule has had an added 
beneficial effect of improving the underwriting quality of those loans.227 Since 
the rule took effect, loans with one of those three restricted features had the same, 
or lower, early delinquency rates compared to the market as a whole.228 
Furthermore, borrowers who received interest-only loans or ARMs with rate 
resets of under five years had better credit scores and much lower LTV ratios and 
initial interest rates on average.229 This is consistent with the intent of the rule to 
strengthen the underwriting of these loans, as the Bureau concluded: “These char-
acteristics suggest that loans with these restricted features may be largely con-
fined to highly creditworthy borrowers.”230 
Taken together, these different strands of studies provide empirical evidence 
that the ATR/QM rule is likely to improve underwriting quality and produce a 
significant reduction in future default rates. Furthermore, the studies of state 
APLs that were in effect during the housing bubble found evidence that regulated 
lenders did comply with those laws. These latter studies cast doubt on the central 
223. See Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, Do State Predatory Lending Laws Work? A Panel Analysis of 
Market Reforms, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 347, 380–85, 381 tbl.9, 382 tbl.10, 383 tbl.11 (2007); 
accord Acolin, An & Wachter, supra note 215 (manuscript at 23). 
224. See Morgan J. Rose, Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties and Default, 40 REAL EST. 
ECON. 662, 703 (2012). 
225. See Acolin, An & Wachter, supra note 215 (manuscript at 22–23). 
226. CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 85–86, 86 fig.20. 
227. Due to small sample sizes, the Bureau was not able to perform this analysis for loans with 
balloon payments, negative amortization, or terms exceeding thirty years. See id. at 89. 
228. Id. at 90–92, 91 fig.23, 92 fig.24, 94–95, 94 fig.26. 
229. Id. at 92–94, 93 tbl.1. 
230. Id. at 92. 
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behavioral critique of the rule—that is, that the rule will lack force when housing 
bubbles are inflating due to lender myopia. 
V. WHY THE BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE DOES NOT 
SUFFICE TO REJECT THE RULE 
Skepticism about the ability-to-repay rule’s potential to regulate bubbles rests 
on a behavioral theory of market participant myopia. According to this theory, 
lenders will bend the ability-to-repay rule when property values skyrocket 
because they will underestimate the chance and consequences of getting caught. 
We do not deny that lenders will have incentives to find ways around the ability- 
to-repay rule in a bubble. However, this is not a sufficient reason to dismantle 
that rule. We argue that there are multiple compelling reasons why the rule is still 
necessary despite the tendency for lenders to attempt to evade the rule during 
periods of euphoria. 
First, although the behavior of lenders is relevant, loan features that would vio-
late the ATR rule today were not illegal at the time, so those risks were not fore-
most in pre-crisis lenders’ minds. Now, the existence of the ATR/QM rule makes 
it necessary for lenders to either decide to abide by the law or knowingly take the 
risk of not doing so. The rule now makes the decision to use such features recog-
nizably risky. 
Second, the myriad objective requirements in the ATR/QM rule force lenders 
to produce and disclose more hard information about loan originations to outside 
monitors, including investors and regulators. The production of that additional 
hard data is useful for monitoring both the development of bubbles and the source 
of non-fundamental and unsustainable price increases. 
Finally, the ATR/QM rule has a more robust enforcement scheme than it 
receives credit for. All mortgage lenders undergo regular federal examinations 
for compliance with the rule and violations are punishable by agency sanctions. 
The CFPB’s ATR/QM regulations are also enforceable by state attorneys general 
and state regulators. For all of these reasons, the ATR/QM law does matter, both 
to consumer well-being and to financial stability. 
A. THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE AND LOAN RISK 
The leading critique of the ability-to-repay rule’s effect on financial stability 
rests on a key behavioral assumption: that lenders will be too myopic during real 
estate booms to respect the rule.231 Although some lenders may be too myopic to 
stop lending during a bubble, the existence of the ability-to-repay rule will likely 
deter lending that violates the rule.232 
When a property bubble is inflating, default rates are low because distressed 
borrowers can usually avoid default by refinancing their mortgages or selling 
their homes to retire their loans. Under these conditions, concern arises that 
231. See generally Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 10 (discussing this behavioral assumption). 
232. See id. at 1544, 1554–56. 
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lenders will underestimate the probability of default and thus the likelihood of ex-
posure. There is additional concern that lenders will further discount the chance 
of enforcement because the ability-to-repay rule is framed as a standard, which 
could make violations harder to prove.233 For this reason, the critique advocates a 
shift to bright-line rules, most notably leverage limits, to curb the systemic risk 
from mortgages.234 
A problem with this reasoning is the bootstrapping nature of the critique. To 
the extent the argument extrapolates from lenders’ behavior during the last hous-
ing bubble, it overlooks the markedly different deregulatory climate in which the 
last housing bubble took hold. Before 2008, most significant mortgage lenders 
faced no effective ability-to-repay requirement (putting aside the narrow slice of 
lenders who were subject to state anti-predatory lending laws in certain jurisdic-
tions).235 Needless to say, one cannot judge the ATR/QM rule’s efficacy based on 
how unregulated lenders behaved. Unlike during the years preceding 2008, today 
the ability-to-repay rule forces lenders to actively take responsibility for comply-
ing with the rule.236 
Internal lender controls have also improved since 2011. In recent years, lenders and vendors have 
instituted sophisticated systems (with many functions automated) to carry out the ability-to-repay rule and 
verify compliance. See NAVIGANT, THE QUALIFIED MORTGAGE AND ABILITY TO REPAY RULES 7 (2013), 
https://docplayer.net/23364701-The-qualified-mortgage-and-ability-to-repay-rules.html [https://perma.cc/ 
G7KS-ZC9H] (“Navigant has helped a number of firms prepare for and successfully implement strong 
compliance and reporting frameworks to create a QM and ATR compliance system, as well as strong 
policies to ensure ongoing compliance and easy access for any regulatory requests.”). These systems are 
part of the new consumer compliance systems that large depository institutions have erected post-crisis. 
Although these systems are not fail-safe, their existence makes it harder to flout the rule. Federal 
examiners and independent outside auditors scrutinize these systems, which adds extra layers of 
protection. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS, Fall 2016, at 12 [hereinafter 
CFPB SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS Fall 2016] (stating that lenders’ overall compliance systems for their 
mortgage originations operations were “strong,” and summarizing recent mortgage compliance 
deficiencies detected in examinations); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS, Winter 
2015, at 13 (summarizing recent mortgage compliance deficiencies detected in examinations). 
233. See id. at 1596 (“[W]ith the exception of [the] documentation requirement, what constitutes 
reasonable care is largely left undefined.”); see also id. at 1597 (noting the ability-to-repay rule is 
functionally a standard because “‘reasonable’ is only given context ex post upon default”). 
234. See id. at 1597, 1598 n.226, 1607–27. 
235. During the housing bubble, national banks, federal savings associations, and their operating 
mortgage lending subsidiaries were exempt from those state laws due to federal preemption rulings. At 
most, only state banks, state thrifts, and other nonbank mortgage lenders had to comply with those laws. 
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 48, at 157–59. Moreover, certain states adopted wild card laws that 
exempted banks and thrifts chartered in those states (plus their mortgage lending subsidiaries) from 
complying with their state ability-to-repay requirements. As a result, the latter requirements only 
applied to independent nonbank mortgage lenders in those states. In part due to the inroads made by 
federal preemption, independent nonbank lenders lost market share and originated less than half— 
45.7%—of higher cost mortgages made by 2006. Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal 
Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home Mortgages, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER 
AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 110, 122 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008). In 
addition, all mortgage lenders—bank and nonbank alike—were exempt from state restrictions on 
negative amortization and balloon terms under the former provisions of the federal Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3801 (1982). McCoy & Renuart, supra, at 115. For more 
about state ability-to-repay requirements, see supra notes 217–26 and accompanying text. 
236. 
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B. THE ABILITY-TO-REPAY RULE’S EFFECT ON HARD INFORMATION 
To some degree, the behavioral critique of the ATR/QM rule is a critique of 
statutory design. It asks whether the rule is too vague to induce lenders’ compli-
ance.237 As Exhibit A, the critique suggests that the overarching commandment 
of the rule is couched as a standard (specifically, lenders must “make a reasonable 
and good faith determination” that a mortgage borrower has “a reasonable ability 
to repay” a loan).238 This is another way of saying that the ability-to-repay deter-
mination by lenders only results in unobservable, soft data. 
If that were the end of the story, the critique might be valid. But it fails to take 
into account that the ATR/QM statute and regulation implement this standard 
with a host of objective requirements, including many that generate hard data 
observable to investors and regulators. We have described those bright-line 
requirements in detail above.239 Most critically, lenders must document and ver-
ify income, assets, and debts using reputable third-party sources. This process 
likely reduces the chance that a borrower’s resources will be exaggerated or falsi-
fied, and thus reduces default risk.240 
These documentation and verification requirements are crucial because 
when lenders evaluate creditworthiness, they look at two types of information: 
“hard” information and “soft” information. Hard information consists of objec-
tive (often numeric) data such as loan-to-value ratios, DTI ratios, and credit 
scores. Soft information involves factors that are predictive or subjective in na-
ture or harder to report in summary form, such as the applicant’s willingness to 
repay, likely future earnings, joint income status, and income derived from 
self-employment (which is easier to manipulate).241 Hard information is easily 
described and reported to external parties such as investors and regulators. Soft 
information is not reported and is therefore not observable to outside 
monitors.242 
During the run-up to the crisis, low-documentation loans were approved de-
spite scant hard data on income and assets. The paucity of hard data supporting 
low-documentation loans posed at least three problems. First, lenders extended 
credit without information on key risk factors for future defaults. Second, low- 
documentation options encouraged mortgage brokers, loan officers, and bor-
rowers to inflate values for income and assets, knowing that those values would 
not be verified or documented. Third, lenders had incentives to shunt borrowers 
237. See Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 10, at 1594–96. 
238. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c 
(2012). 
239. See supra Section III.A. 
240. See Floros & White, supra note 83, at 95, 96 tbl.5. Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy 
acknowledge the documentation and verification requirements but do not discuss their implications. See 
Bubb & Krishnamurthy, supra note 10, at 1596. 
241. Benjamin J. Keys et al., Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime 
and Subprime Mortgage Markets, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2071, 2072, 2077, 2080 (2012). 
242. Id. at 2073, 2077. 
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with volatile income that was easily overstated into securitized low-documenta-
tion loans.243 
Today, in contrast, the ATR rule effectively outlaws low-documentation loans, 
thus requiring the production of hard data on borrowers’ income and assets where 
before there was none. Through objective requirements such as income documen-
tation and verification, the ATR/QM rule helps to ensure the production of suffi-
cient hard data on a key determinant of mortgage default to allow better 
monitoring. 
C. THE RULE’S ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Finally, the behavioral critique of the ATR/QM rule airs doubts about the 
effectiveness of the rule’s enforcement mechanisms. On this view, the rule’s 
private liability provisions are empty threats because lenders will only regard 
liability as likely in the event that borrowers default. However, lenders dis-
count the chance of default during housing bubbles. When rising home prices 
transform into full-blown market mania, originators will regard the chance of 
default as remote and, with it, the chance of damages exposure. Without the 
sword of private liability hanging over their heads, originators will revert to 
the same dangerous course of unsafe loans that we experienced during the last 
housing bubble. 
This account, however, fails to consider a number of important dynamics. 
First, whatever doubts critics may have about the in terrorem effect of the ability- 
to-repay rule’s private right of action and foreclosure defense, the market 
response has been the opposite of predictions. Housing prices have been rising in 
the United States since 2012,244 
S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA), FRED ECON. DATA (Nov. 
26, 2019), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA [https://perma.cc/9TVT-UUDP].
which should have caused lenders to throw liabil-
ity concerns to the wind if the criticism is right. But that is not what we see. 
The non-QM market remains small,245 
See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 61, 71, 116, 120–21, 127–29. Kaul and 
Goodman described the non-QM market for 2017 as a “drop in the bucket” compared to total mortgage 
originations that year. KARAN KAUL & LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST. HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., 
WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD REPLACE THE QM GSE PATCH 4 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/99268/2018_10_30_qualified_mortgage_rule_update_finalized_4.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/384M-MT45]; accord LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST. HOUS. FIN. POLICY CTR., THE 
REBIRTH OF SECURITIZATION: WHERE IS THE PRIVATE-LABEL MORTGAGE MARKET? 3 tbl.2, 15 (2015), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/65901/2000375-The-Rebirth-of-Securitization.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/325N-YGVJ]; NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, SURVEY OF MORTGAGE ORIGINATORS, 
SECOND QUARTER 2017: HIGHER DTI CAPS AT FANNIE MAE, & THE IMPACT OF FED REINVESTMENT 
ENDING 2 (2017), https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2017-q2-survey-of-mortgage- 
originators-08-22-2017_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZL9-6G4A].
partly due to a lack of capital markets  
243. One study found that “lenders relax[ed] screening of low-documentation loans in the subprime 
market on dimensions that [were] easily manipulated because they [were] unreported to investors.” Id. at 
2075, 2103–04; see also Brent W. Ambrose et al., Credit Rationing, Income Exaggeration, and Adverse 
Selection in the Mortgage Market, 71 J. FIN. 2637, 2638 (2016). 
244. 
 
245. 
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financing,246 but also reflecting concerns about liability.247 Indeed, liability fears 
caused community banks to successfully lobby Congress in 2017 and 2018 for 
the small bank portfolio QM in the bill that eventually was enacted as 
EGRRCPA.248 To date, although we agree with the CFPB that the real degree of 
exposure is in fact quite small, industry and investors have treated the liability ex-
posure as real. 
We should hasten to add that the safe harbor protection for prime-rate QM 
loans does not relieve originators from private liability in toto. A lender, if chal-
lenged, must first make a prima facie case that the loan meets the requirements 
for a QM loan. Among other things, this requires the lender to show that it per-
formed the ability-to-repay analysis (complete with documentation and verifica-
tion) that the QM definition requires and that it adhered to the 43% DTI cap (for 
General QMs) and all other QM definition requirements. Without that proof, the 
loan is a non-QM loan and comes with full liability for any violations of the rule. 
Consequently, even an ostensible QM loan carries some marginal ability-to-repay 
risk for ability-to-repay violations. 
In addition, the private cause of action and borrower defense that Dodd–Frank 
authorized are not the only avenues of enforcement. A host of other mechanisms 
enforces compliance with the ATR/QM rule. Importantly, many of these mecha-
nisms kick in much sooner than far-off private borrower redress. These alterna-
tive forms of oversight increase the likelihood of faster detection and thus 
deterrent effect. 
To start, all mortgage lenders, big and small and regardless of charter type, 
undergo regular examinations by federal regulators for compliance with the 
rule.249 This is particularly significant because the Dodd–Frank Act required inde-
pendent nonbank mortgage lenders to undergo federal consumer compliance 
examinations for the first time starting in 2011.250 Today, nonbank mortgage lend-
ers comprise the fastest-growing segment of the mortgage market, accounting  
246. The private-label mortgage securitization market on Wall Street in which non-QM loans would 
most likely be securitized collapsed in 2007 and remains on life support today. See KAUL & GOODMAN, 
supra note 245, at 3 tbl.2. 
247. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 11, 116–18, 150, 197 & fig.62, 246–47; KAUL & 
GOODMAN, supra note 245, at 4. 
248. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
249. The CFPB conducts consumer compliance examinations for all independent nonbank mortgage 
lenders plus depository institution lenders with total assets of $10 billion or more. Smaller depository 
institution lenders undergo consumer compliance examinations by their respective federal prudential 
regulator (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve System, or the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)). 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514–16 (2012). In addition, the federal 
prudential banking regulators examine insured depository institutions and credit unions for solvency. 
Those solvency examinations can unearth ability-to-repay violations as well. 
250. See id. § 5514. 
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for 66% of mortgage originations in 2019.251 As a result, the CFPB now super-
vises a large swath of the mortgage origination market that escaped federal 
examinations before 2008. 
On top of the federal scrutiny that supervision entails, federal examinations 
can lead to other knock-on effects exerting discipline over lenders. Following 
examinations, federal examiners have publicized errors in compliance.252 
See CFPB SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS Spring 2017, supra note 108, at 3–8; CFPB SUPERVISORY 
HIGHLIGHTS Fall 2016, supra note 236, at 13–14; Catherine Minor, Mortgage Loans with Balloon 
Payments, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Dec. 7, 2015), https://minneapolisfed.org/publications/ 
banking-in-the-ninth/mortgage-loans-with-balloon-payments [https://perma.cc/8J7R-XCJ3]. So far, 
according to CFPB Supervision, violations of the ATR/QM rule have been rare. CFPB ATR 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 80–81 (remarking that “[s]upervision has observed that most entities, 
depository or non-depository, examined by the Bureau are generally complying with the ATR/QM 
Rule”); id. at 241 (noting that mortgage originators “have generally been complying with the ATR 
Rule”). Although there is evidence of “infrequent” violations of the points-and-fee cap, particularly by 
mortgage brokers, id. at 166–70, such violations have little or no effect on default risk. 
Violations can trigger federal banking sanctions in the form of cease-and-desist 
orders or civil money penalties, either by the CFPB or by the lender’s prudential 
regulator.253 In addition, state attorneys general and state regulators have author-
ity under the Dodd–Frank Act to sue to enforce the ability-to-repay rule and other 
provisions of the federal Consumer Financial Protection Act.254 
Id. § 5552. For lawsuits by state attorneys general and state regulators to enforce the federal 
Consumer Financial Protection Act, see, for example, Complaint, New Mexico v. Landau, No. 14-cv- 
00663 (D.N.M. July 23, 2014); Complaint, Lawsky v. Condor Capital Corp., No. 14-cv-2863 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 23, 2014); Complaint, People v. CMK Invs., Inc., No. 2014-ch-04694 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 2014); 
Amended Complaint, New Mexico v. Capital One Bank, No. 13-cv-00513 (D.N.M. July 2, 2013). For 
commentary on these lawsuits, see Jennifer M. Keas, Recent Settlements of Joint UDAAP Enforcement 
Between State and Federal Regulators, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.foley.com/en/ 
insights/publications/2015/03/recent-settlements-of-joint-udaap-enforcement-betw [https://perma.cc/RL5S- 
R9YB]; Barbara S. Mishkin, Update on State AGs/Regulator Lawsuits Using Dodd–Frank Authority, 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor. 
com/2015/01/27/update-on-state-agregulator-lawsuits-using-dodd-frank-authority-2/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2LML-UMJ4]; Anna Zarndt et al., Pennsylvania Suit Against Navient Continues—Commonwealth’s 
Claims Are Not Preempted by Federal Law or Parallel CFPB Action, TROUTMAN SANDERS: CONSUMER 
FIN. SERVS. L. MONITOR (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancialserviceslawmonitor.com/2018/ 
12/pennsylvania-suit-against-navient-continues-commonwealths-claims-are-not-preempted-by-federal- 
law-or-parallel-cfpb-action/ [https://perma.cc/9LFN-WEXZ].
Even if federal 
regulators are guilty of laxity during bubbles, these multiple overlapping centers 
of enforcement—particularly at the state attorney general level—help ensure that 
the threat of sanctions has bite.255 
In addition, investors and rating agencies monitor compliance with the rule. In private-label 
securitizations, the rating agencies demand higher credit enhancements for non-QM loans carrying 
ability-to-repay risk. See, e.g., S&P GLOB. RATINGS, REQUEST FOR COMMENT: METHODOLOGY AND 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR RATING U.S. RMBS ISSUED 2009 AND LATER 49–52 (2017), https://www.spratings. 
com/documents/20184/908542/RFCusrmbs42017.pdf/2dbb8521-1ee3-49c2-b7b3-f532279490b8 [https:// 
perma.cc/TRB9-NCSR]. For an example of rating agency and investor oversight of ATR litigation 
risk, see S&P GLOB. RATINGS, PRESALE: ARROYO MORTGAGE TRUST 2018-1, at 7, 9, 17 (2018), 
251. HOUSING CHARTBOOK, supra note 153, at 11. For a more general discussion of nonbank 
mortgage lending, see McCoy & Wachter, supra note 36. 
252. 
253. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818, 5565. 
254. 
 
255. 
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https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/769219/ArroyoMortgageTrust20181/528a1b13-2c4d-479c- 
bdf2-bcb6a992fcdd [https://perma.cc/6HP3-C9EC]. 
Meanwhile, investors require lenders to confirm their compliance with the ability-to-repay rule 
through representations and warranties and can demand recourse if those representations and warranties 
are violated. For an example of recent representations and warranties warranting compliance with the 
ATR/QM rule, see MOODY’S INV’RS SERVS., SEC RULE 17G-7 REPORT OF R&WS: WELLS FARGO 
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 2018-1 TRUST DEAL V1.0 COMPARED TO RMBS V3.0, at 4, 11–14 
(2018), https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_1088884 [https:// 
perma.cc/R44U-FPFA]. For a general discussion, see McCoy & Wachter, supra note 36, at 293–97. 
Properly capitalized lenders paid billions of dollars to settle recourse demands in recent years. Id. at 
298–99. 
To recap, the small size of today’s non-QM market indicates that Dodd– 
Frank’s private relief for violations of the ability-to-repay provisions has an in 
terrorem effect for now. To boot, that private exposure is only one of a long list 
of public and private mechanisms for ensuring compliance with the ATR/QM 
rule. These mechanisms include periodic federal examinations, press releases by 
regulators about problems with compliance, federal and state sanctions for viola-
tions, internal lender controls and external inspections of those controls, private 
monitoring by rating agencies and investors, and, to some degree, investor flight. 
Notably, many of these oversight and enforcement tools activate sooner than pri-
vate liability, enabling quicker detection and greater deterrence. Moreover, the 
objective nature of many of the ATR/QM requirements and the extra-hard data 
that the rule makes lenders produce improve the quality of oversight by public 
and private monitors alike. 
The empirical research to date substantiating the benefits of the ability-to-repay 
rule, the rule’s objective requirements and their positive effect in generating hard 
data, and the multiple oversight mechanisms for enforcing the rule provide strong 
support for the conclusion that the ATR/QM rule will help to curb default rates if 
economic conditions go south. It will accomplish this result by preventing mort-
gage loans with high-risk features—especially negative amortization, interest- 
only terms, and reduced documentation—from being made to anyone but pristine 
borrowers. In the process, the rule creates a national legal floor that makes it 
harder to loosen credit standards in a bubble. By placing a brake on spiraling 
demand for houses, the rule can work to slow runaway housing prices. For these 
reasons, the ability-to-repay rule is vital not only to households’ welfare but also 
to financial stability. 
VI. THE ISSUE OF LEVERAGE LIMITS 
We have shown that the ATR/QM rule contains numerous objective require-
ments that facilitate outside monitoring and increase lenders’ compliance when 
property values are in ascent. These features make the ability-to-repay rule an im-
portant weapon against deterioration in credit standards during incipient bubbles. 
This does not resolve the question, of course, of the role leverage limits (LTV 
caps) should play in quelling bubbles. Excessive LTVs and CLTVs are the  
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biggest driver of mortgage defaults of any single factor.256 
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-805, NONPRIME MORTGAGES: 
ANALYSIS OF LOAN PERFORMANCE, FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DEFAULTS, AND DATA SOURCES 22 fig.9 
(2010); CHRISTOPHER L. FOOTE ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOS., PUB. NO. 08-3, NEGATIVE EQUITY 
AND FORECLOSURE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 8 (2008), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/ 
Workingpapers/PDF/ppdp0803.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL2F-Y9K5]; Campbell & Cocco, supra note 84, 
at 2–3, fig.1; Demyanyk, supra note 84, at 80–82, 85–87, 86 tbl.1; Demyanyk et al., supra note 84, at 
13–15, 13 tbl.3, 15 tbl.4; Elul et al., supra note 84, at 6–7, 11 tbl.1; Mayer et al., supra note 84, at 42–43; 
Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 84, at 413 tbl.3, 415 tbl.5; John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, 
Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mortgage Default, 11 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 99, 
102–03, 103 fig.2 (1995); Julapa Jagtiani & William W. Lang, Strategic Default on First and Second 
Lien Mortgages During the Financial Crisis 16, 21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 
11-3, 2010), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/ 
2011/wp11-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8CR-JEHF]; Sherlund, supra note 84, at 9–10, 23 tbl.5. 
Accordingly, there are 
good reasons why Professors Bubb and Krishnamurthy advocate leverage limits 
and why other countries rely on this tool to constrain systemic risk. Where we 
and they depart is in their emphasis on LTV caps to the exclusion of the ATR/ 
QM rule in regulating bubbles. 
Currently, in the United States, there are no binding national leverage limits on 
residential mortgages,257 and the only effective caps are those imposed by invest-
ors and guarantors. The largest investors and guarantors today—Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and FHA—all have LTV limits of their own.258 In contrast, the 
RHS has no LTV limit259 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MAXIMUM LOAN AMOUNT: SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING GUARANTEED 
LOAN PROGRAM 26, https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/RD-SFH-MaxLoanAmountNotes.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/B6PV-XC6R] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
and the VA sometimes allows zero-down-payment 
loans.260 
The VA’s leverage limit varies according to the transaction, and some veterans can obtain VA- 
guaranteed loans for nothing down: “The basic entitlement available to each eligible Veteran is $36,000. 
Lenders will generally loan up to 4 times a Veteran’s available entitlement without a down payment, 
provided the Veteran is income and credit qualified and the property appraises for the asking price.” VA 
Home Loans: Loan Limits, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/ 
purchaseco_loan_limits.asp [https://perma.cc/V4FB-XCBR] (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
In the non-agency space, portfolio lenders and private-label investors 
can impose whatever leverage limits they want, including none. 
Relying on leverage limits instead of the ability-to-repay rule to constrain bub-
bles would be a mistake. First, LTV ratios have been shown to be unreliable and 
misleading during bubbles because they are endogenous indicators that mask the 
reality of unjustifiable price appreciation.261 
See Jose G. Montalvo & Josep Raya, Constraints on LTV as a Macroprudential Tool: A 
Precautionary Tale 6–9 (Barcelona Graduate Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 1008, 2017), https:// 
www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/1008.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS45-CCMP].
During housing booms, property pri-
ces increase and appraisers compare these market prices to determine appraised 
values.262 Moreover, property appraisers have incentives to inflate their appraisals 
to accommodate lenders’ desire to close loans and thus to assure themselves of 
256. 
257. The federal prudential banking regulators have an interagency guidance that recommends credit 
enhancements for certain residential mortgages extended by depository institutions that have LTVs 
exceeding 90%. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 34, subpt. D, app. A § 34.62 (2014) (national banks); id. § 
160.101 (federal savings associations). However, that guidance is not binding. 
258. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
259. 
260. 
261. 
 
262. Id. 
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repeat business from lenders.263 Inflated appraisals create a feedback loop in turn, 
as comparable sales based on those appraisals artificially boost the appraised 
property values in future sales, which are then reflected in the denominator of 
LTVs. Because loan-to-value is by definition a ratio, the numerator and denomi-
nator terms covary. Thus, LTV ratios can look deceptively low when property 
values are rising, presenting a fac¸ade of consistency even when prices are out of 
line with fundamentals and allowing borrowers and lenders to circumvent LTV 
limits.264 We can see this from the experience with LTV ratios in 2006. At the 
height of the bubble, these ratios varied little from those in 2014, after credit 
standards had tightened.265 In contrast, debt-to-income ratios were “extremely 
loose” during the boom period.266 
Consequently, it is important not to depend on leverage limits alone to regulate 
default risk. Instead, consideration of LTV caps should be part of a comprehen-
sive approach that includes the ATR/QM rule, appraisal rules, and other mort-
gage safeguards.267 The debt-to-income limit is a particularly critical tool in this 
arsenal. Again, under the double-trigger theory of mortgage default, households 
default not due to negative equity alone, but also because they lack sufficient 
income to make their mortgage payments. Accordingly, using DTI caps to limit 
mortgage payments to manageable proportions can help reduce defaults. The 
recent CFPB assessment of the ATR rule concluded as much, reporting: “after 
controlling for other underwriting criteria, . . . higher DTI . . . independently 
increase[s] expected early delinquency, regardless of the other factors.”268 
CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 104–05; see id. at 100–05, 112–15. DeFusco and 
coauthors found similar but smaller effects. See Anthony A. DeFusco et al., Regulating Household 
Leverage 5 (May 7, 2019) (working paper), https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northwestern.edu/ 
dist/a/1657/files/2019/05/DeFuscoJohnsonMondragon2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BFH-P73K]. Other 
studies by Green and by Goodman question the use of DTI caps in the QM test. See Richard Green, The 
Trouble with DTI as an Underwriting Variable—and as an Overlay, RICHARD’S REAL EST. & URB. 
ECON. BLOG (Dec. 7, 2016), https://real-estate-and-urban.blogspot.com/2016/12/the-trouble-with-dti- 
as-underwriting.html [https://perma.cc/K47M-XTAW]; Laurie Goodman, New Data Confirm the 
Urgency of Addressing the Expiration of the GSE Patch, URB. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www. 
263. See Leonard Nakamura, How Much Is That Home Really Worth?: Appraisal Bias and House- 
Price Uncertainty, 2010 BUS. REV. 11, 16; see also Montalvo & Raya, supra note 261, at 6 (reviewing 
literature discussing these incentives). 
264. LTV limits can also be gamed during bubbles by incurring added home-secured debt as a 
home’s value soars through junior liens, either in the form of simultaneous piggyback second loans or 
later through refinance transactions. This allows LTV ratios to stay deceptively flat while home values 
rise. The ATR/QM rule circumvents this manipulation by requiring repayment ability to be underwritten 
to the total outstanding indebtedness on the home. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(2) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(b)(12), (c)(2)(iv), 
(c)(6) (2019). 
265. Greenwald, supra note 65, at 9, 10 fig.2. 
266. Id. at 11; accord CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 97–98. 
267. It is worth noting that even though the ability-to-repay rule does not impose leverage limits, it 
does address high CLTVs indirectly. First, the rule requires lenders to determine ability to repay based 
on the total indebtedness on the property, which will be larger for higher CLTVs. Second, under the rule, 
lenders must evaluate ability to repay based on the full monthly mortgage obligation, including taxes 
and insurance, which puts an added constraint on LTV. Finally, the rule limits borrowers’ ability to incur 
subsequent added debt on their homes unless they are able to pay the new total debt service. 
268. 
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urban.org/urban-wire/new-data-confirm-urgency-addressing-expiration-gse-patch [https://perma. 
cc/9D8A-YWL8].
DTI limits have a further salutary effect by limiting housing bubbles.269 In a 
rising price environment, as a home surpasses a set price, the mortgage payments 
on the house will exceed the DTI limits of buyers who are income-constrained, 
preventing them from borrowing more no matter how much the house is worth.270 
These customers are likely to drop out of the pool of eligible buyers for that par-
ticular home, thereby reducing demand and the price pressures that can inflate a 
bubble.271 As a result, DTI limits are “the more effective tool for limiting the size 
of boom-bust cycles,” compared to LTV caps.272 
The CFPB adopted a 43% DTI limit for General QMs. In a landmark study, 
Daniel Greenwald modeled the 43% DTI cap and reported that the cap could 
have reduced the pre-2008 housing bubble by more than a third had it been in 
effect at the time.273 
Greenwald’s findings have particular relevance for the current debate about 
what to do with the GSE patch when it expires. Currently, the GSE patch contains 
no set DTI cap but defaults to the internal DTI limits of the GSEs, which are 50% 
for loans undergoing automated underwriting.274 Significant segments of the 
mortgage industry are urging the CFPB to lift DTI caps altogether.275 In our view, 
that would be a serious mistake. Rather, the CFPB should retain a DTI cap to con-
strain both default risk and future housing bubbles.276 
To conclude, it is a false dichotomy to suggest that the ATR/QM rule is an 
either–or proposition when it comes to financial stability. The rule serves a vital 
role in reducing systemic risk, and leverage limits likely do as well. Limitations 
on LTV, moreover, must be designed countercyclically and buffers put in place 
when prices exceed fundamentals. 
CONCLUSION 
It is now well-accepted that housing is particularly susceptible to bubbles and 
busts, fueled by credit expansions and collapses that undermine financial stabil-
ity. However, ten years after the crisis, there is still little consensus on the appro-
priate policy response to systemic instability arising out of the nexus of housing 
and credit bubbles. Dodd–Frank imposed an ability-to-repay rule often under-
stood as designed for consumer protection. Here, we argue that this rule also 
helps to prevent credit bubbles and protect financial stability. 
 
269. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 99–100. 
270. Greenwald, supra note 65, at 7–8, 8 fig.1. 
271. David Aikman et al., Would Macroprudential Regulation Have Prevented the Last Crisis?, 33 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 107, 120–21 (2019). 
272. Greenwald, supra note 65, at 45; accord Aikman et al., supra note 271, at 119–20. 
273. See Greenwald, supra note 65, at 4. 
274. See supra note 151. 
275. See CFPB ATR ASSESSMENT, supra note 96, at 257–59. 
276. Our recommendation assumes that the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which is the GSEs’ 
conservator and regulator, would carefully oversee the DTI limits adopted by the GSEs under the patch. 
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Answering concerns that the ATR/QM rule is ill-suited to regulating bubbles 
because lenders will ignore it, we draw on new empirical research showing that 
lenders do observe ability-to-repay requirements, including during housing bub-
bles. We also address the call to replace the ATR/QM rule with leverage limits in 
regulating bubbles. In our view, this is a false dichotomy. The ATR/QM rule 
plays an indispensable role in curbing housing bubbles. 
The reason is that, if left to private market forces, constrained borrowers will 
increase demand for homes whenever DTI ratios are eased in good times. The 
resulting price increases can be significant and can lead to price expectation for-
mation that fuels further price increases. Beneficially, when DTI ceilings are 
paired with the full income documentation and verification that the ability-to- 
repay rule requires, those ceilings can help to limit price spirals.277 In contrast, 
LTV ceilings do not limit property spirals because housing values—the “V” in 
the LTV ratio’s denominator—rise with market prices, allowing borrowers to 
take on more debt and stoke the demand for homes while still facially complying 
with the LTV ceilings. At the same time, we should not make the mistake of 
ignoring housing price inflation and focusing solely on the ATR/QM rule. If lend-
ing unsustainably expands, even if composed of “safe” ATR/QM-compliant 
loans, unsafe bubbles can result, which in themselves can cause recessions when 
they bust. The ensuing recession and lower income can raise post-origination 
debt-to-income ratios to levels that result in heightened defaults and systemic 
crises. 
However, under the ATR/QM rule with the income verification and DTI caps 
now in place, even if bubbles were to gain some momentum, the severity of the 
impact on consumers’ ability to repay would be more contained than otherwise. 
Moreover, if housing prices fall, pushing a significant fraction of borrowers 
underwater on their mortgages, after a bubble, in the absence of a general macro- 
recession, the rule will help contain defaults. Homeowners, wishing to stay in 
their homes, would continue to repay because they could. To this point, in the 
aftermath of the last crisis, approximately 75% of underwater owners who could 
pay their mortgages continued to do so and did not engage in strategic default.278 
Consequently, maintaining the ATR/QM rule with its income documentation and 
DTI provisions would go a long way toward preventing the types of foreclosure 
crises that further depress housing-market pricing and undermine the stability of 
the financial and household sector.  
277. See Greenwald, supra note 65 (describing the beneficial effect of DTI caps on property value 
inflation). 
278. Luigi Guiso et al., The Determinants of Attitudes Toward Strategic Default on Mortgages, 68 J. 
FIN. 1473, 1483–84, 84 fig.1, 1490–93 (2013) (finding that approximately 75% of homeowners who 
were underwater by at least $100,000, as well as 90% of homeowners who were underwater by at least 
$50,000, would continue to pay). 
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